

## Neopatrimonialism as a Functional threat to Good Governance and Development in Africa

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**ABSTRACT:-** *The leadership challenges in Africa manifesting in festering governance and development crisis may have its roots in patrimonialism. The coinage 'African patrimonialism' or 'neopatrimonialism' have foundered in understanding the pattern of political organisation, struggle and puzzling change translating into democratic authoritarian rule of the few, characterised by co-optation, factionalism, and clientelism, and other modes of elitist domination. This paper adopts a particularistic approach to grapple with the narrow and narrowing peculiarities that currently dominate the processes and structures of leadership crisis, which has led to dearth of good governance and development occurring in West African and Southern African Countries. The paper argues that a culture of institutionalised subjugation of the political sphere over the economic pervades in the sub-regions, leading to a norm of profoundly state-driven economy and a character of patron-clientele interactions between the state and the economy. Following independence, countries in these sub-regions for instance, had a leading sector (minerals, cocoa and petroleum), which might have significantly paved way for the development of an assertive economic class empowered enough to drive home-grown development and politically agitative middle class independent enough to foster accountable governance. However, successive governments in the countries of these sub-regions over-exploited these sectors, thus consolidating a neopatrimonial fusion of economic and political elites in which the business class had little or no influence on the course of economic policy and in the process, further blunted the rough edges of democratic values bequeathed by the departed colonial fathers.*

Key Words: Clientelism, Development, Good Governance, Neopatrimonialism, Patrimonialism

### I. INTRODUCTION

As countries in Africa attempt solutions to the realities of transition to good governance and economic growth, many reforms are often necessary in the arena of governance. People clamouring for changes in the developing regions of Africa have been making positive attempts to strengthen their public administrative system, with a view to building a system that provide feedbacks to the citizens, and which effectively support economic development and growth. A major threat therefore is that in most political systems of Africa there are stronger men than strong institutions – a situation tagged 'patrimonialism'.

Proponents of the concept of neopatrimonialism assert that distinct features distinguish governance in the African state from its counterparts in other world regions (Bratton/van de Walle 1997; Chabal/Daloz 1999; van de Walle 2001b). The particular nature of the African state, characterised by the lack of separation between the public and the private sphere, is found as fundamentally inhibiting state capability on the continent.

Indeed the word 'patrimonialism' was employed as a way of explaining political cohesion in African societies of government's apparatus built in patron-client model around a strong personality and not the institution and which urgently need administrative re-configuration and disciplined workforce. Weber (1947) coined the phrase patrimonialism to describe situations where the administrative apparatus is appointed by and responsible to the leaders (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009). Patrimonial administration is closely associated with clientelistic politics, for administrative jobs are among the choicest plums a boss or patron can offer his protégés. Such jobs are more valuable than the equivalent posts in a state subject to the rule of law that has carefully circumscribed job descriptions.

Under the patrimonial system Administrators are recruited and promoted as reward for personal connections with political leaders, there is an unspoken hierarchy, with little specialisation or specification of output and uncertain reporting channels, important information may be given orally (Yahaya, 2007). The argument here is that governance systems are basically the same and that clientelistic politics and patrimonial administration cannot deliver the needed impetus to deliver good governance. As societies grow richer and more complex, they tend to rely more heavily on the universalistic and egalitarian principles typical of democratic and rational-legal governance (Kensall, 2011). This is both a positive end in itself and a means for making further social, economic and technological improvements. Asserting the essential role that institutions play in the growth of a nation, Court, Hyden and Mease (2003) posited that the manner in which institutions are allowed to operate impacts greatly on a country's economic and development performance. According to them, since dissent cannot be avoided among individuals and groups, every society requires strong institutions 'that can resolve disputes'.

African countries entered the period after the Second World War on the basis of a gradually intensifying popular mobilisation against continued colonial domination. The sources of the popular discontent against colonial rule were many. As Adebayo (2005) aptly pointed out, they included a strong desire to overturn the affront against human liberty and the dignity of the African which colonialism represented and a generalised rejection of the continent. Others, according to him, are the issues of racially based segregation of opportunities for social advancement and access to resources, amenities and services. This led inevitably and increasingly to the highly disputed politico-administrative framework that denied the colonised full, unfettered participation and representation in the structures of governance (Adebayo, 2005).

Nigeria as a postcolonial nation has experienced many of the problems common to other new nations. It began its independent existence in the enviable position of having proven reserves of oil (it currently produces between \$US18 and \$US30 billion of oil a year), a relatively developed infrastructure associated with strong primary industry development, and a fully functioning administrative bureaucracy. Yet, its subsequent history is one of economic difficulty, political violence, and growing poverty amongst its peoples (Sachs and Warner, 1995). A notable argument in the literature on Nigerian, and nay African, governance is that the arenas of politics are highly personalised. Without recourse to the constructive potentials that strong personalities wield, the literature appear to present the situation more from the gloomy side than otherwise. Nevertheless, historical records are replete with personalities who have utilized their (rather) overbearing influences to move their societies forward.

For instance, Walshe (1971) and Akyeampong, Gates and Steven (2012) discussed how the South African activist of the late 1800s, John Tengo Jabavu, utilized his 'strong personality' to discourage political leaders of the Cape Province to eschew tribal sentiment and participate in the political process as recognized in the constitution. Pretorius (2009) wrote of the very influential, farsighted and impressive personality profile of the First post-apartheid South Africa in, not only making the country a 'regional heavyweight' in global reckoning, but also in ensuring the instilling of democratic ethos in the then military-ruled Nigeria.

Anda (2000) submitted that Kwame Nkrumah's 'strong personality' effectively converted the potentials available in Ghana early 1960s to the enviable heights later attained. According to him, 'the significant role of leaders' ideologies in West Africa' led to 'the emergence of radical, moderate and conservative approaches in the quest for solutions to inter-African problems.' He argued that the constructive interplay of the 'gradualism' approach of the Brazzaville-Monrovia Group of 1960 (subsequently known as the Lagos Group in 1962) and the ideological militancy of the Casablanca Group of 1961 produced the ingredients for the laudable collaborative efforts between/among West African States 'in much of the 1960s' (Anda, 2000). Thus, perhaps but for the hard-wearing postures of these leaders and their respective holds on their people, the logger-heads occasioned by the colonial leaders could have been successful and retarded the process of independence. Yet, the struggle to overcome the scourge of underdevelopment has led many writers to blame it on the leadership. As the personalities at the helms of affairs, such attribution is irreducible. In some States of Africa, the formations of political parties are deliberately skewed towards personality prejudice. As Chege (2007) pointed out, most parties in Africa are governed by 'strong personalities' that operated these important institutions as though it were family affairs. He submitted that crucial decision are therefore taken at the unofficial levels of familial interactions than in strict party loyalty and discipline. This leads, invariably, to followership anchored on personalities rather than on ideological similitude and dearth of 'strong foundation for a durable competitive party system' (Chege, 2007). With this scenario in place, party leaders, often the founding personalities or the succeeding surrogates to whom leadership is bestowed upon by the original leaders, wield tremendous singular powers. And, because of the large following that the aforementioned often engender, the clientele relationship between the followers and the leaders develop and predominate in the system. In another instance, Mangwanda and Lacombe (2015) underscore how the South African politics and governance system is more of personality-based than issue-based- in cold contrast with politics in the United States of America. Ngara, Esebonu and Ayabam (2013) argued that despite the institutions of democracy which ideally should

serve as constraints, former President Olusegun Obasanjo's strong personality 'had overbearing and domineering influence on both domestic and foreign policies' in Nigeria. This ruler-knows-it-all has been tagged in political science as 'patrimonialism'. In a patrimonial state, the rule dovetails to an individual, not the institution, and he/she rules by whims and caprices belayed in his/her pride and prestige.

According to Shopeju and Ojukwu (2013), authority in a patrimonial state is by personal prejudice, and not necessarily according to established rules and regulations. Unfortunately, this scenario is threatening to pervade the entire political landscape of Africa. In South Africa, 'an exception to the general trends that shape political life elsewhere in sub-Saharan', the ruling party ANC's leaders' attitude, 'in which specific public services and resources are offered to particular groups in exchange for political support', is a pointer to this (somewhat wrong) direction (Lodge, 2014). Lodge (2014) significantly traced this to three sources: historically, the ANC's struggles built around the personality of her largely exiled leaders; operationally, the resort to felony for political liberation that created a kind of radicalism within the party fold; and a general tendency in the country's culture of clientele politics and economic. Pretorius (2009) argued that the puzzle perhaps lies in the first-pass-the-post (FPTP) electoral system adopted in most African political system. Such arrangement inevitably leads to the formation and administration of political parties that is '[rather] personality-based, without clear policy and ideological direction' (Pretorius, 2009).

At any rate, patrimonialism has been severally and severely condemned by scholars and commentators alike because of its negative impact on good governance but not many have attempted a causal investigation into the phenomenon and the factors sustaining it despite its torpedoing effect on peace, political security and the development of the nation.

Most observers recognize that any adequate account of the region's poor performance must extend well beyond narrow economic factors. Adverse world market conditions and internal structural rigidities on their own do not adequately explain Africa's stagnation and decline. Meanwhile, the changes in relative prices central to the structural adjustment programme controversially prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have, whatever their merits, proved insufficient to generate sustained growth and development (Derick Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002; Erdmann and Engel, 2006).

Although, on face assessment, it would seem that much of the current interest in the issue of democratization, economic reform and governance emanates from the international donor agencies presently involved in Africa, especially the World Bank, it is important to emphasize at this stage that long before the donor community turned its attention to this question, numerous African groups and social forces had been involved in struggles for the expansion of the democratic space on the continent as well as for the institution of structures of governance that would permit the will of the majority of the people to prevail (Ukeje and Olaiya, 2009). This is evident from the entire history of the anti-colonial struggle, which was as much about political reforms as about economic and social change with a view to enhancing individual liberties and popular participation.

## II. CONCEPTUALISATION OF PATRIMONIALISM

Patrimonial politics is both peculiar and diverse. While it can be addressed from different perspectives, it could also be construed from the monolithic standpoint. For instance, it has been established that patrimonialism seems to be best suited to the least developed countries, where relatively simple economic structures are more responsive to relationship-based governance (Roth, 1968). As the economy grows and becomes more sophisticated, more rules-based governance is probably required. Also, patrimonialism seems unlikely to work in all political systems. Where power is regularly or continually changing hands through the ballot box, there are strong incentives for political leaders to focus on short-term rent-management rather than plan for the long term.

Increased, personalized, centralization of rents by either party leader in these circumstances would be likely to prove very controversial and damaging. Subsequently, rent-centralization is likely to be exceedingly difficult in societies where a few large ethnic groups are competing for political power, as in Nigeria and contemporary Kenya. Moreover, countries such as Equatorial Guinea or Central African Republic, where technocratic integrity has reached very low ebb, are unlikely to make a success of rent-centralisation (Soest, 2010). Nevertheless there are some nations in which developmental patrimonialism looks the most viable route to pro-poor growth. An example, albeit rare, can be cited of Ethiopia – an extremely poor, landlocked economy with no liberal tradition of note and in which market failures are widespread. Kelsall (2011) submitted that in the past two decades the dominant regime of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), under a near-domineering leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, has presided over the increased centralisation of rents and implementation of a long-horizon development strategy that aims to guide Ethiopia to middle income status (Kelsall, 2011).

In the words of Stewart and Brown (2009), key features include control over a large state-owned enterprise sector and substantial regional development organisations, together with tight regulation of financial

institutions and expansion of the tax base. Regional 'endowment funds' are also important. These are charitable trusts with strong links to the ruling party that act as holding companies for a variety of different businesses. They play a role in financing or facilitating investment in areas of weak private involvement, and by small or new businesses, including emergent youth cooperatives (Wolf, 2006). A category of donors, namely Western governments and their official and agencies, went on to embrace a new "political conditionality" under which economic aid was tied to the progress of African governments with political reform and respect for human rights.

Yet, as we shall see in greater detail later, the notions of political and economic reform, which the donors have generally attempted to promote in Africa, run counter to those held by the main bearers within the continent of the struggle for democratization and popular participation. Structural adjustment programmes was then introduced into Africa on a massive scale from the early 1980s onward at a time when most African economies were already caught in deep crises of accumulation (Olaiya, 2011). These crises manifested themselves not only in terms of rapidly declining output and productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors but also in terms of worsening payments and budget deficits, acute shortages of inputs and soaring inflation, growing domestic debt and a major problem of external debt management, decaying infrastructure, a massive flight of capital and declining per capital GDP and GNP among others. The reform programmes that were introduced under donor pressure and supervision were aimed at stabilizing the African economies, restructuring the basis for accumulation, and permitting the resumption of growth. What the medium to long-term effects of the adjustment programmes would be not only on the economy but also on the practice of politics and the process of administration became the subject of a major theoretical debate involving two broad schools. The differing positions articulated by both schools, namely, the Neoliberal and the Radical Political Economy schools, is, in many respects, a function of their understanding of the sources of the African economic crises and the role of the post-colonial state in the developmental process (Adebayo, 2005).

### III. NEOPATRIMONIALISM

Neopatrimonialism is the vertical distribution of resources that gave rise to patron-client networks based around a powerful individual or party. Once argued to be necessary for unification and development after decolonization, these regimes have supplanted the role of the inherited colonial institutions for the benefit of a few individuals. It is significant nowadays because it affects almost all sub-Saharan states to differing degrees and is not regarded as corrupt behaviour by the population, who rely on the system for their own survival. Neopatrimonialism affects policy making, especially development projects, and is responsible for the misuse of aid and state budgets. Unsurprisingly, characterisations of contemporary African states and elites has continued to be contestable ranging from those that describe them as "venal", "prebendal", "overdeveloped", "dependent", "rentier", "vampire", "petty bourgeois", "neo-colonial", "neo-patrimonial" to the "gatekeepers" (Mkandawire, 2011). In South Africa, whose constitutional democracy is globally celebrated, state elites are openly accused of "crony capitalism and tenderpreneurship" as well as "state capture" (Desai, Maharaj and Bond, 2011).

Whereas Pitcher, Moran and Johnston's (2009) rejection of the conceptualization of "patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism as negative regime types associated with corruption, clientelism, and autocracy" cannot be ignored, the pervasive personalistic (patrimonial) logic of stronger regimes and weaker states amidst distortion and personalization of state power, corruption of authority and bureaucratic personal aggrandizement remain theoretically unaccounted in Africa. Pitcher et al. (2009) argue that contemporary conceptions of neo-patrimonialism as a pervasive negative regime for governance of Africa associated with corruption, clientelism and autocracy are a product of the misreading of Weber's patrimonialism. Overwhelmingly, scholarly explanations of African governance through the concept of patrimonialism have, according to Pitcher et al. (2009), insisted that personalistic power and rule have remained the primary obstacles for continental progress "even in the face of democratization and bureaucratic reforms". Using the Botswana model, Pitcher et al (2009) cast as simplistic, the notion that personalistic power and rule has historically led to dysfunctional democracies and citizenry activism, because patrimonialism has become "a convenient catch-all for Africa's ills". Whereas this caution and call for "rethinking patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism in Africa" is reasonable, its rationale is unfortunately constructed on the misconception of the deep fissures between tenets and practices of traditional society and modern democratic governance in the continent.

Globally, liberal democracies too have faced self-selection between merit and patronage system or merit and representativity in governance of economics and politics (Labuschagne 2010; Chikane 2012). The African traditional system of governance, even where tempered with aspects of modern globalist logic, does not invalidate the notion of a strong association between neo-patrimonialism and social ills such as corruption, patronage, dearth of accountability, abuse of state power, state violence and nepotism in Africa. Pervasiveness of patrimonial logic everywhere in African states "favours well-connected insiders over innovative outsiders", to use The Economist (2012) conceptual coinage. Prevalence of African patrimonial logic is intricately

associated with states “plagued by cronyism and corruption”, if Wooldridge’s (2012) phraseology could be borrowed. Russian and Egyptian experiences affirm that “bureaucratic” regimes attendant to the scramble for state rule and power under pervasive patrimonial logic tend to dominate both the state and business, thereby (re)producing “cronyism, inequality and eventually discontent” (The Economist, 2012). Clapham (2002) asserts that while individual cases of state failure and collapse may owe much to specific circumstances and the behaviour of particular individuals, they must also be understood within the context of a world in which maintaining states has become increasingly difficult.

African states have appeared to be “expensive” to maintain in the contemporary international system largely because the global public discourse is itself captivated by the four fragmentary and poorly integrated development paradigms, where none holds “a monopoly on innovation, social justice, resource efficiency or pro-active risk management” (Glemarec and Puppim de Oliveira, 2012). Hence, there is “hollowness” in the “existing models of sovereign states” and the global statehood “narratives of security, representation, and wealth and welfare” (Clapham, 2002). That is, coloniality of knowledge, power and being has continued to be pervasive for Africa, necessitating therefore rigorous examinations of the concept of neo-patrimonial governance in South Africa itself, a liberal democracy. South Africa’s governance has always held promise, but the past twenty years of democracy has been clouded with discrepancies in implementation. By definition, poor governance is an antithesis of “good governance”, characterized therefore by corruption, clientelism, autocracy, dearth of accountability and unresponsiveness to the genuine needs and aspirations of society.

Undoubtedly, the culture of corruption, self-enrichment and conspicuous consumption among a few state functionaries and poor responsiveness to citizens’ popular grievances, often visited with brutal state violence, has become endemic in the past twenty years (Ballard, Habib and Valodia, 2006; Buhlungu and Atkinson, 2007; Atkinson, 2007; Binza, 2010; Desai, Maharaj and Bond, 2011). Given that the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), is a former mass-based liberation movement, genuine questions of state neo-patrimonialism should be framed. Post-2000, state and party power were deliberately centralized (Atkinson, 2007; Binza, 2010); and, it can germanely be construed that the ANC, likely to continue its hold of state power for the foreseeable future as “the natural party of government” (Butler, 2007), could equally agitate for pervasive patrimonial logic. It will be hard to dismiss the reality that the ruling regime has increasingly become stronger whilst the state weakened.

Importantly, Pitcher et al. (2009) neglect the wide gap in capabilities between African traditional authorities and the modern democratic polities. Thus, modern democratic governance, agitated through the globalist logic, do not espouse values and customs similar to those of African traditional authorities. In South Africa itself, the structuring of relations between the Zulu King and subjects as well as the modern democratic state have remained perpetually in negative national headlines. It is for the same reasons that the Swaziland system is abhorred from the modern globalist logic. For these reasons, this article holds that personalistic power and rule continued to operate optimally under African traditional societies and authorities, but that such pervasive patrimonial logic exclusively holds deleterious effects of non-responsive regimes, state violence, autocracy, lack of accountability, corruption, nepotism, clientelism and such other social ills, under modern democratic electoral governance. That is, the rejection of the interpretive value of the concepts of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism in African governance is a dangerously flawed call for continued adherence to the modern globalist logic of fundamentalist universality and truths. Botswana’s governance model is a far cry from a typical African regime, elite and state. Instead, African governance yawns for pluriversal epistemic perspectives.

Inescapably, contemporary Africa and South Africa cannot be tenably described as post-colonial and post-apartheid, respectively, largely because the “colonial axis” continues to be persistently inscribed in relations of domination, exploitation and “the production of subjectivities and knowledge” (Grosfoguel, 2007). Such coloniality will continue to produce and reproduce subaltern African governance under modern globalist logic democratic bureaucracies if they are pervaded by patrimonial logic. Indeed, Africa’s neo-patrimonial states incorporate elements of “personalized rule”, “elite subservience to the core” and “a shadow state”, where there is no differentiation between the public and private spheres of governance (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Herbst, 2000; Boas, 2003; Fawcett, 2005; Cammack, 2007; Bayart, 2009; Gibb, 2009).

Governance tends to be focused on “personal power, patronage, clientelism and, from a Western perspective, corruption” (Gibb, 2009). Under neo-patrimonial governance, the state control of resources and power is made to reside at the heart of African regimes’ reluctance to share sovereignty for collective development (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Herbst, 2000; Boas, 2003; Fawcett, 2005; Bayart, 2009; Gibb, 2009). The same predicament occurs in domestic politics where the citizenry’s needs are circumvented as the regimes become increasingly autocratic, unresponsive, despotic and violent. Under such governance and regimes, “development, is less important to the neo-patrimonial state elites than the continuation of their personal power and prestige”; and, the imperative for promotion and enhancement of the “order inducing properties” even under reformed bureaucratic democracies inspired by the modern globalist state logic (Fawcett, 2005; Gibb, 2009).

A regionalism perspective provides conclusive logic of the deleterious effects associated with personalistic rule and power in Africa. African leaders have historically supported “tangible plans” for “achieving unity and development” and continental recovery and renewal (Ramutsindela, 2009). In practice, though, African states seem to have been unwilling to share sovereignty, a quality assumed to be necessary for the success of continental initiatives (Gibb, 2009; Bachmann and Sidaway, 2010). For instance, most African states ceded membership to instruments of continental governance such as the Peer Review Mechanism for the purposes of “mobilizing resources and asserting state sovereignty” (Bachmann and Sidaway, 2010). Both Gibb (2009) and Bachmann and Sidaway (2010) attest to the notion that African states have instead adopted an approach that is “actually rather more nuanced and sophisticated, designed principally to support the neo-patrimonial African state system”. Evidently, the scope for the so-called post-colonial exercise of state sovereignty has been intricately intertwined with regionalism and/or continentalism, thereby allowing for the establishment of nominal regional/continental cohesion plans, and rhetorical commitments and configuration of sovereignty (Bachmann and Sidaway, 2010).

#### IV. THE CONCEPT OF “GOOD GOVERNANCE”

The term “good governance” first appeared in development aid policy at the beginning of the 1990s in connection with the events surrounding the end of the cold war and subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall. At that time, it became clear that the effectiveness of development cooperation depended on governments, including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), to react swiftly, reliably and transparently were critical to meeting the expanding needs of the people. The World Bank then coined the term “good governance” with the intention of increasing the effectiveness of public funds.

Around the same time, a German version “gute Regierungsführung/good government leadership” emerged but the English term was preferable by the global leaders due to its reference to both the leaders of public as well as nongovernmental institutions and also because the “gute Regierungsführung” is prone to misinterpretation. Thus the preferred English term appeared broader in scope to encompass interrelation and division of roles between the state, civil society and the private sector. Such roles are founded upon some important principles namely, participation, transparency, non-discrimination, effectiveness and reliability of public affairs. The whole essence of this is to ensure that the citizens of a country – both as individuals or as a group – can participate and contribute fully in their development process while being fully aware of their rights and obligations.

Ipso facto, “good governance” became a term that development institutions and other global players taunt as precursors to development and economic growth. As the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued, “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”. Ban Ki Moon (2012) also stated that the development of a truly global partnership for driving a lasting development includes, although not limited to, good governance. However, despite over two decades of constant usage and appearance of the term “good governance” in various literature, the term has nevertheless acquired the notoriety of having no single and exhaustive definition, nor is there a definite delimitation of its scope, that commands universal acceptance. The term “good governance” could imply many different things in many different contexts, depending on the circumstances or institution(s) or the mission at hand. The term has been extremely elusive despite a degree of consensus around its usage. It means different things to different organizations, not to mention to different actors within these organizations.

As Gisselquist (2012) pointed out the ‘routinely focus on other types of governance — global governance, corporate governance, IT governance, participatory governance and so on — by governance experts make matters even more confusing. These variant of governance related only peripherally to the good governance agenda vis-à-vis domestic politics and administration considering the simple fact that these variants of governance and the issues they address appeared veered away from the necessary intendment of the World Bank and other allied institutions from whom the term originated. The work by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks on good governance, according to Gisselquist (2012), addresses economic institutions and public sector management, including transparency and accountability, regulatory reform, and public sector skills and leadership. Other organizations, like the United Nations, European Commission and OECD, also highlight democratic practices and human rights, aspects of political governance not focused by the Bank. Other issues treated under the governance programmes of various organisations include election monitoring, political party support, combating corruption, building independent judiciaries, security sector reform, improved service delivery, transparency of government accounts, decentralization, civil and political rights, government responsiveness and “forward vision”, and the stability of the regulatory environment for private sector activities (including price systems, exchange regimes, and banking systems).

However, the term has acquired a popularity that is difficult to ignore in the literature on political economy. Because it is used with great flexibility, the situation has had an advantage of dynamism and adaptability for assessing effectiveness in the entire terrain of socio-political and economic contexts. However,

such dynamism could also constitute a source of some difficulty at the operational level. For instance, it could be difficult to assess a state that has advanced in one area while the other areas are still at large. Nevertheless, depending on the context and the overriding objective sought, good governance has been said at various times to encompass democratic practices, respect for human rights, adherence to the tenets of rule of law, popular participation, multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, institutional transparency and accountability, charismatic leadership, an efficient and effective public sector management, political legitimacy, freedom of information and unfettered access to knowledge and education, banishment of poverty and political empowerment of people, economic sustainability, and political culture that foster responsible citizens and responsive government, cultural harmony and religious tolerance.

However, there appears to be a significant degree of consensus that good governance relates to political and institutional processes and outcomes that are deemed necessary to achieve the goals of development. It has been said that good governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law. Thus, even though the term 'good governance' appears vague in definition but nevertheless has gained a seeming consensus in the international development literature. The UNCHR (2010) submitted that good governance describes how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources in order to guarantee the realization of public welfare, rule of law and conducive business and political environment. Hugue and Zafarullah (2005) argued that 'good governance' revolves primarily around the exercise of authority of government and how the authority is exercised in accountable manners. They demonstrated that the idea of good governance is to build (market) institutions that will eventually foster development.

## V. PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE.

The key attributes to good governance can be summarised as: participation of all and sundry, including the marginalized, in decision-making process; ensuring devolution of powers and decentralized and supply-driven planning and service delivery; taking and enforcing decisions in a manner that follows laid-down rules and regulations; developing internal capacity of government and NGOs in terms of financial, institutional, and management aspects; Increased level of transparency and accountability of the service providers; bridging the identified gaps between policy and practice; eradicating poverty and squalor through identifying and targeting the hard core poor, the aged, the physically/mentally challenged and the disoriented members of the society; networking of government bureaucracy through increased coordination among sector stakeholders to provide a template for harmonization of social service delivery; and effectiveness and efficiency in the actions of governments and other stakeholders. The concept has been further clarified in 2009 by an important publication of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).

## VI. PATRIMONIALISM, DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE CRISIS IN AFRICA

Deciphering how patrimonialism has become 'the core feature of post-colonial politics in Africa', Jeng (2012) argued that the character of the pre-colonial and colonial societies depicted of loose tyrannical system operated by the local and colonial elites, respectively. The author submitted that in both cases, there was no institution but rather strong individuals who unleashed tyranny on the people 'because there was no strong institutionalization, no effective political structures or an accountable, checks and balance system' (Jeng, 2012). Bach and Gazibo (2012) argued that patrimonialism is a political system in which rulers administer national resources as though it were personal benefit with a view to securing the followership of the people. This section essentially discussed the series of events that led to the emergence of clientele form of politics in Africa. It traced the root causes to the advent of colonialism and the pattern of states that the former colonies metamorphosed into. The essence is to demonstrate that the emergence of strong individuals (statement) in much of African States is not unconnected with the nature of governance perpetuated in the colonies.

If anything, the statement that later emerged, with larger-than-life status witnessed the tyranny against their people by the colonialists: only that they too could not resist the enormity of powers that led to such tyrannical rule in the first place. This leadership crisis comes in different forms. Albin-Lackey (2009) argued that even though the Nigerian godfathers hardly nurse ambition to attain political offices, they nonetheless wield the strong power to ensure the election of (often less credible) candidates. They then become the mobilisers of the state resources within the control of these stooges, to maintain/expand their hegemonies and also to ward off possible contenders.

Decades ago, African countries entered the period after the Second World War on the basis of gradual intensification of popular uprisings against continued colonial domination. The sources of the popular discontent against colonial rule were many. In summary, they included a strong desire to overturn the affront against human liberty and the dignity of Africans, which colonialism represented. As Adebayo (2005) pointed out, it also boiled down to a widespread rejection of the continued, racially-based segregation of opportunities for

social advancement and access to resources, amenities and services; the increasingly untenable politico-administrative framework that denied the colonised full, unfettered participation and representation in the structures of governance; and the intensive draining of the resources of the colonies without a corresponding commensurate investment in the development of their physical and social infrastructure, as well as in their human resources.

All of these concerns crystallized into a concrete political agenda and momentum for the decolonisation of Africa; they were also the critical platforms on which popular support for the anti-colonial struggle was mobilised. Indeed, this was being pointed out by many students of the African anti-colonial movement, the unity between the nationalist politicians who spearheaded the independence struggle and the popular social movements, including mass organisations of workers, peasants, students, and the urban poor, that sustained the struggle was built around these concerns. The promise of independence nationalism lay not only in discarding colonial rule and the broad-ranging exclusion on the basis of which it thrived but also opening up access to economic, social and political opportunities. In other words, the anti-colonial nationalist coalition was held together by the promise of freedom, unity and development. In this sense, the promise was at the core of the post-colonial social contract that linked state and society in the post-independence period.

On the whole, much of the first decade of independence was marked by efforts to give meaning to the social bargain that underpinned the nationalist anti-colonial struggle. Irrespective of whether they declared themselves as being socialist, free market, or mixed economy in orientation, the independence governments all invested, without exception, in expansion of the social and physical infrastructure of their countries in a manner which widened access to education, modern health facilities, transportation, housing, skills development, and employment on a scale that exceeded what colonialism was able to offer. For this purpose, and again irrespective of the ideological leanings that they professed, all of the independent governments reserved an important role for the state in the development process (Schafer, 1998).

Also, they undertook varying degrees of planning designed not only to improve the foundations of the economy but also to continually increase access to opportunities in a context of huge, pent-up demand (Schafer, 1998). They were aided in this regard by the reasonably high levels of economic growth which most countries recorded during the first decade of independence and which, in virtually all countries, was above the rate of population growth. Indeed, when the average growth rates recorded by African countries over the period from the 1960s to the early 1970s are compared with those that were experienced during the structural adjustment years of the 1980s and 1990s, the immediate post-independence years, for all their shortcomings, would seem to have been golden years of some sort in spite of the best efforts of the Berg Report to falsify the history of that period. To be sure, the effort to give content and meaning to the postcolonial social contract was not without its internal contradictions and limitations.

Nowhere were these contradictions more evident than in the realm of the political framework within which the post-colonial development process was undertaken. Initially involving the gradual demobilisation of the social movements whose engagement and activism gave life and momentum to the anti-colonial struggle, the post-independence political framework was eventually to take the form of the narrowing of the national political space as political pluralism gave way to political monopoly symbolised by the rise of the one-party state and military dictatorship. The immediate context for this constriction of the political space and political participation was defined by the way in which the goal of national unity and integration was handled: the assumption that the objective of uniting the multi-ethnic and, in many cases, multi-religious countries of Africa after decades of colonial strategies of divide and rule was one which could only be constituted from above by the state.

This top-down approach to the national unity project soon translated into a monopolisation of the political terrain by the state in a process which was accelerated first by dissolution of the anti-colonial nationalist coalition, then by the slowdown of the rate of economic growth and, therefore, of the rate of expansion of opportunities for different categories of people, and, finally, the emergence in the course of the 1970s of a deep-seated crisis in the post-colonial model of accumulation that signalled the beginning of the end of the post-colonial social contract. A rich literature already exists on the origins and dimensions of the African economic crisis to warrant an exclusion of their detailed discussion here (Sanni, 2007; Smith, 2003; Sindzingre, 2010). It is important, however, to underline two points. First, the management of the crisis was accompanied by increased levels of political repression and exclusion, which further widened the gulf between state and society, popular social forces and the wielders of state power.

The widespread feeling of powerlessness and choicelessness that pervades the African political landscape in spite of the strong push made by popular forces for the reform and expansion of the political space explains why such commentators as Claude Ake have suggested that the 1990s in Africa were characterised by the democratisation of disempowerment in which people voted without choosing. Clearly then, the political question remained a key outstanding issue even as Africa was ushered into the new millennium (Adebayo, 2005). As Brett (2006) deduced, this failure came about, neither because corrective measures 'imported' into

African States were altogether incongruous, nor because African rejected them, but for reasons he termed 'fundamental social conflict and structural weaknesses'.

The author posited that the failure was inevitable in Africa where, unlike in the advanced liberal communities, the subjects are not politically informed and economically autonomous to discern and respond accordingly. The African States, the author argued, composed of former slaved and impoverished subjects that fundamentally lacked the political will and economic powers to 'practice the possessive individualism' necessary to drive the so-called institutional transformations (Brett, 2006). In addition, the resources to run the costly and 'complex state apparatuses, political parties, pressure groups, media organisations, and educational and research institutions that sustain democracy' are lacking in the created States of Africa (Brett, 2006). Hence, the leaders lost grip of the system and resulted to patronage politics of payee and paymaster to retain foothold, which the theory of patrimonialism explains today.

## VII. PATRIMONIAL GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA

The struggle by the civil society to enthrone democracy in Nigeria under the military regimes was on the assumptions that it will bring good governance. Therefore, it is good governance that sustains democracy which strengthens democratic institutions. Under Obasanjo's administration, what we got was patrimonial governance because institutions that sustain good governance in a democracy were and are still, weak. Political parties in Nigeria as very important democratic institutions have diminished in meaning and purpose they are meant to serve. Ibrahim (2016) notes; The practice in Nigeria is that political barons and Godfathers take decisions on behalf of party members who have no say in the running of party affairs. It is actually an aberration to talk of party members in Nigeria. Membership cards are given to barons and godfathers who keep them until the need to use them arises, usually for a party convention. At that point the godfathers would bus their "members" or "clients" to the venue and give them the cards with instructions (under Oath) on who to vote for and payments for their services. It is therefore a straightforward patron-client relationship which the patron pays for the services of his clients.

In this regards, their political investment must yield dividend by turning the state through the leader they brought to power into patrimonial governance. The Nigerian Elite know that both wealth and power come from access to the state. In such political system there is no autonomy between the hegemonic classes and the state apparatus. Controlling the state is therefore serious business that pushes the elite to all sorts of extremists' tactics to secure access to power. In advanced capitalist societies there is a major difference between the politics of the bourgeoisie and that of the political elites in Nigeria. The interests of the bourgeoisie are the maintenance of law and order, and the dispositions which regulate economic life and ensure the production of the exploitation relationship vis-à-vis the productive class. On the other hand, the interests of the political elites are to preserve their privileged positions at the summit of organization against rival elites.

Indeed, political elites in Nigeria and the so called lumpen bourgeoisie are made by the state and still rely on the state for patronage. This makes the contest and keeping power in Nigerian state a do-or-die-affair. Patrimonial arrangements become part of access to power and also keeping power away from increasing number of political elites who seek power. This accounted for Obasanjo transferring power in patrimonial connection to President Yar'Adua by default to Goodluck Jonathan. Why patrimonialism? Many nation states in Africa in the post military rule adopted presidential system of government, because the power of Executive President which is equivalent to the power of a junta and a king. In this regard, the leaders and many of the citizens still maintain the mindset of kingship and feudalism (a ruler should be in the position for life) (Kusa, 2014).

This could explain the reason Obasanjo anointed Musa Yar'Adua, the younger brother to his family friend, the late General Shehu Yar'Adua a member of the military political Barons in Nigeria politics, and a vice president that will be loyal to the political machine when his third term bid failed. To them, political success is defined as the capacity to explore and exploit every available option to access the state through ethnic, home town, family and clan connections, the military gangsterism, trade unionism, professional Associations, and Personal Connection are also used to leap frog their way to access (Ibrahim, 2016). The Musa Yar'Adua Administration was not eventful to measure the level of patrimonial governance because it was short lived due to his death. But First Ladyism played out when there was power vacuum, due to the President ill health.

His wife Hajiya Turai Yar'Adua, the first lady whose office was listed as the third in order of protocol on the official website of the State House was so powerful. It was a common knowledge that the first lady was fully in charge of many of the decisions in the presidency. She was the president's closest adviser and did not hide it. She played a key role in the emergency of key federal government appointees. Even State governors desirous of closer relationship with the President, court the office of the First Lady (Ibrahim, 2016). These advantages of power made her the de facto President. The First Lady with her patrimonial appointees almost executed a civilian coup for her to take over power when her husband died because of constitutional lapses. It was the intervention of legislature that saved the situation which led to the vice President assuming the position of President. Because the new president was a child of patrimonial governance, he was made the vice president

by the patrimonial leaders on the credential of being loyal deputy governor and will also likely to be a loyal vice President to the late President Yar'Adua.

Therefore, President Good luck could not have done otherwise, since he was a product from the patrimonial leaders. The state therefore was turned to oil the wheel of governance to sustain this power bloc, through corruption. Evidence from high profile political appointees under Good luck administration arrested by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the money recovered says it all. Ibrahim (2016) in this vein states; Today after ten Months in power we are in-undated on a daily basis by numerous revelations about mega corruption and what is clear is that corruption under the Jonathan Good luck Administration was carried out with such recklessness. A few hundred persons were stealing billions of Naira and making governance impossible. More seriously is the massive allocations for arming our troops was simply diverted to private pockets, thereby strengthening the Boko Haram insurgency.

This happened because government is run based on family, friends, patrons, sons and daughters of political Barons, and loyal party members. In this regard there is no boundary between state resources and private use so long you are part of the patrimony. Through, Buhari, the concept of power is cleansing the political arena of the corrupt elite and self-serving persons who tend to dominate, and replacing their dirty politics with a return to providing for public good. Nigerians voted for Buhari precisely because that was the change they wanted, because they saw the zeal in him when he came into power as a Military General on 1st January, 1984. However, his charisma is known nationally, but politics reduced his charisma to the northern dominated Muslims geo-political zone by the press, who accused him of religious bigotry. He then needed a bridge to the south to have access to state power.

This was made available for his victory by the southern patrons, who also funded his election. To this end he has to serve two masters. The northern dominated Muslims who mobilized and gave him votes, and the southern patrons who funded his election and mobilized votes for him in the south. The corrupt politicians who never gave him a chance in other elections, even as military leader all of a sudden worked for him in the election victory. Under this situation, with his good intentions to change the patrimonial governance in Nigeria, it has been difficult for him. He is the only man standing in the change party (All Progressive Congress), while all others in his party and cabinet are for business as usual. As a politician, he has to please his geo-political zone in Nigerian tradition and the patrons that funded his election victory. Ibrahim (2016) observed; The Buhari Administration is making appointments that are skewed towards the North in general and towards Muslims in particular. One of the most talked about is the leadership of security agencies in which only three out of seventeen positions are filled with people from the south. The other is the board of NNPC, which is said to be skewed against the presumptive owners of petroleum, the Niger Delta.

There was no denial of the observation made above; rather government officials justified it on the ground that the Buhari administration has been allocating more top jobs to the North, just as the Jonathan Good luck Administration gave more to the South-South and South-East, Nigeria. On the other hand, the clients of the patrons that funded his election were given the juicy ministerial positions like Works, Power and Housing, Finance, Communication, Transport and Information in order to offset the funds provided by their patrons in 2015 elections and to be in the position to fund the next election in 2019. The understanding of the political elites in Nigeria is that access to state power is to serve private interest as against public good. In this regard, whoever manipulate the election through religion, ethnic, family connection, patron-client ties and geo-politics to gain power deploys it to serve these primordial interests. Many African states (including Nigeria) are headed by patrimonial regimes that have vested interests in resisting popular participation.

African rulers have proven to be crafty and innovative within state governance centered on elite domination. For instance, many governments implement democracy within a context of ongoing violence, intimidation, corruption and a general lack of transparency and accountability. In other words corruption is maintained behind the façade of democratization. Such a context allows for continued plundering of natural resources, misuse of state institutions and of private armies. This has led certain commentators to conclude that such "features of public life in Africa suggest that the state itself is becoming a vehicle for organised criminal activity (Bayart et al, 1999). The system does not represent significant institutional pressure aimed at holding the governing elite accountable to the people and is not a serious threat to their monopoly on power. Essentially, the process of democratic opening that represents progress is being manipulated and undermined through political corruption built on patronage politics so as to ensure regime survival and avoid the peaceful handing over of power to nonpatrimonial leader.

The experience of Nigerians in state governance shows that the erosion of public institutions, as a result of corruption, autocratic rule and the political manipulation of patrimonialism of ethnicity and religion has not abated. Without a fundamental, indeed, revolutionary transformation of governance in Africa (Nigeria) in both private and public sectors and at local, provisional and national levels, the woes of the continent will deepen. The way forward is to lay emphasis on "quality democracy" an approach that will serve to strengthen democracy and popular belief in the democratic system of governance. This is a process which seeks to develop

appropriate relationship between African states and their citizens, one in which the state ceases to function as a vehicle for personal enrichment (Ibrahim, 2016). That is, African states must actively seek to deepen democracy through reconstructing the relationship between state and society.

Institutions that sustain democracy as outlined in the constitutions of African states should be allowed to function. African leaders must learn that the first step toward a self-reliant future and the restoration, material and non-material, of the continent's situation is the establishment of governmental and institutional legitimacy and accountability. Entrenched political corruption has become one element of a broader phenomenon that can be called catastrophic governance and endemic practices that steadily undermine Nigeria's capacity to increase the supply of public goods and development. The crux of the matter boils down to the absence of the appropriate formal institutions or their systemic perversion by the forces of neo-patrimonialism who engage the state in kleptocracy in the name of governance in Nigeria. In conclusion, our debate is that if the government corrupts the institutions of governance, where will the development come from? Where is democracy?

**Latest Order of Patrimonialism:** 'Stomach Infrastructure' Syndrome in Nigeria patrimonialism is undoubtedly the pessimistic insights used by political scientists to 'explain the political catastrophes experienced in Africa' and its attendant primary accumulation tendency that generates 'destructive effects' (Brett, 2006). The author justified this by asserting that, since patrimonialism is the use of clientelistic value systems to sustain political support, rather than legitimized means associated with electoral, democratic and liberal values, the consequence 'is likely to be institutional failures' (Brett, 2006). This, according to the author, is because the existing old structure would clash with the newly introduced ones and produce dysfunctional institutional collisions. With respect to Nigeria, however, the situation appears more complex. From the analysis above, the institutional clash is expected to occur during, and perhaps shortly after, the transition from old to new structures. The situation of Nigeria appeared sustainable on take-off, due largely to the advent of crude oil windfall that stabilized the political economy (Olaiya, 2013). But, no sooner had the system stabilized than the concatenation of serious patronage politics began to materialize. A number of works have established that, following the advent of oil revenue and the attendant profligacy of public funds; hardly can anything pass by without gratification (Aremu and Ahmed, 2011; Olaiya, 2013; Macebong, 2014; Ejiofor, 2015). In the very recent time, a process in which voters are openly gratified with consumable items on (or close to) election days has led to the emergence of another political vocabulary called 'stomach infrastructure'.

'Stomach infrastructure involves bribing electorate in a brazen manner, with material incentives like rice, vegetable oil and 'small cash' during elections. Sometimes, voters openly demand this indulgence while on queue to cast their votes (Ojo, 2014). The term literally emerged around the mid-2014 during the governorship election in Ekiti State of Nigeria. During the time, the incumbent governor, Kayode Fayemi of All Progressive Congress (APC), relied on his radical development provision of social infrastructure as a guarantee for victory at the poll. On the other hand, his challenger, Ayodele Fayose of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), subscribed to and embarked on distribution of consumables to the citizens and eventually won the election with a wide margin. As the so-called stomach infrastructure crept into the Nigerian Political lexicon, it has attracted a number of conceptualisations, at least in the domestic realm. The concept has been approached from various walks of life. Aremu and Ahmed (2011) argued sociologically that the concept of gratifications in Nigeria is a reflection of government's failure to curb crime and provide gainful employments to the youth.

Macebong (2014) positioned 'Stomach infrastructure' philosophically as simply the anecdote that describes 'the system by which political patronage is dispensed to various groups in a particular society'. He argued that such 'patronage' predates and transcends election manipulations and can manifest in varying forms. According to him, influencing job placement for a relative by 'putting in a good word' to a high-ranking ruling party chieftain; ensuring awards of contract to a close political ally or their relative; and guaranteeing issuance of necessary documents to meet a point and time of need, are a recurring decimal in Nigeria. The author further argued that the term 'grassroots politics' insofar as 'Nigeria is concerned, is more or less a fancy term for building and maintaining stomach infrastructure' or having a strong 'political structure' that constantly dispense political gratifications to the 'masses'. To Ejiofor, (2015) 'stomach infrastructure' is a two-side coin – history and psychology of African masses. Historically, Ejiofor (2015) argued that 'the concept of the stomach infrastructure' dates back to the 'pre-independence regional elections across the country'. To him, Nigerian political history shows that 'politicians who appealed to the conscience of the masses via their stomach always had the upper hand' in elections.

Since then, and across the board, a good number of the elections conducted at all levels 'were won and lost courtesy of the stomach infrastructure.' (Ejiofor, 2015). Psychologically, Ejiofor (2015) argued that, as established in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, nutrition is the most basic of physiological and safety essentials, which should be top on the agenda of the governments of Africa. The author surmised that, because food-related poverty is rampant in Africa, it should be expected that a hungry man could be too angry to appreciate the benefits of the physical and social infrastructures that are built for him. Idike (2014) in her study

entitled “Reinforcing democracy in Nigeria” explained how politicians in Nigeria and their proxies have cashed in on the weakness of the social fabric created by pent-up poverty to arrive at ‘stomach infrastructure’. Following from these various works, most especially Idike (2014) study, we therefore developed a paradoxical twin-paradigm explanation of voters’ preference that led to the development of ‘stomach infrastructure’. The first paradigm is a familiar one but with bizarre outcome: it relates to losing election despite developing physical and social infrastructures that, in conventional governance parlance, should guarantee ‘landslide’ victory. The second paradigm is not quite familiar but comes also with curious outcome: it relates to winning election by ‘directly giving bailout cash to needy citizens, giving them food items and attending to their sundry personal problems’ (Idike, 2014). Hence, ‘stomach infrastructure’ can be both a cause and effect of clientele politics of the rentier states, a process described (and condemned) by democracy theorist as abhorrent to the development drives of the states.

### VIII. NEOPATRIMONIALISM IN ZAMBIA

Since independence, Zambia’s rulers have consistently applied all three features of neopatrimonial politics: Concentration of Political Power; Award of Personal Favours; Misuse of State Resources.

The first facet, the systematic concentration of political power, implies the dominance of one individual, ‘who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks’ (Bratton/ van de Walle 1997). As a defining feature of this ‘big man politics’, the president or, in other words, the patron, stays in power for a long time, sometimes until the end of his life. Indeed, presidents in sub-Saharan Africa on average officiate significantly longer than their counterparts in Asia and Latin America (Bienen/van de Walle 1992). On the other hand, neopatrimonial rulers frequently rotate the political elite in order to prevent any potential opponent from developing his or her own power base and also in order to extend the clientelist net. Bratton and van de Walle term this feature ‘presidentialism’. However, this is misleading as the traditional political science definition of presidentialism refers to political systems in which the president is directly elected by the electorate, exerts the executive power and cannot be deselected by parliament (in contrast to parliamentary systems). This article therefore refers to the phenomenon in question as ‘concentration of political power’.

The simultaneous fulfilment of both requirements, a long tenure of presidents and a short tenure of key government members, therefore suggests a neopatrimonial power concentration. This has exactly been the case in Zambia. With Kenneth Kaunda, Frederick Chiluba and Levy Mwanawasa, the country has seen three powerful Presidents since independence in 1964. Their average length of tenure amounts to 14 years, which stands above the 11.6 years African state leaders have on average managed to stay in power from 1980 to 2005 (van de Walle 2005). The first President Kaunda served for 27 years in office and entrenched his power with a corps of personal advisors which in turn reduced the influence of the cabinet and other units of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP).

He not only gained from particular legitimacy as Zambia’s founding President who had led the struggle for independence but also augmented his control of the political process by promulgating the one-party state in December 1972 (Tordoff/Molteno 1974; Scott 1980). The neopatrimonial centralisation of power in Zambia also finds expression in the frequent change of ministers. The average tenure of key ministers from independence until today stands at only 2.4 years. Consequently, the most important cabinet members have exercised their functions for only half of a legislative period on average. This pattern of ‘elite circulation’ (Burnell 2001b) has shown a high degree of consistency and has endured during Zambia’s one-party Second Republic (from end of 1972 to 1991) and during the multi-party Third Republic (since November 1991). In a major cabinet reshuffle in April 1993 for instance, President Chiluba removed those reform-minded ministers he perceived to be a threat to his rule from office.

In Zambia’s multi-party ‘Third Republic’ the President is eligible to one re-election only. This term limit became contested in 2000 when some quarters in the ruling party MMD – apparently backed by the President – tried to amend the constitution in order to allow for a third term of President Chiluba. Only after massive public protests was this exercise stopped (Rakner/Svåsand 2005; Rakner 2003). These manoeuvres strengthen the case being made of a neopatrimonial power concentration in Zambia. Key ministers included the Vice-President/Prime Minister and the Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior. Under President Kaunda, the average tenure was 2.4 years, under President Chiluba 2.7 years and under President Mwanawasa (up to the year 2005) 1.6 years. Due to the comparatively short endurance of the Mwanawasa Presidency, the figures give only first indications about big man rule trends in his administration (Tordoff/Molteno 1974). The neopatrimonial concentration of political power has been a feature consistently applied in Zambian politics.

#### Award of Personal Favours

Not only do Zambia’s Presidents frequently rotate ministers, they also award personal favours to other elite members in order to secure their rule. A prime means has been the expansion of the ministerial cabinet,

which features prominently for awarding personal favours in Africa (van de Walle 2001a). The Zambian cabinet has grown significantly over the years; from 14 ministers in 1964 to currently 23 members. This is congruent with the trend in many African countries. Van de Walle shows that the average number of cabinet ministers in the region rose from 20.1 members in 1979 to 24.6 in 2000 (2005). As in Zambia, these cabinet sizes cannot be substantiated with functional necessities. Most developed countries, having much larger populations and economies, are governed by cabinets of only 15 to 20 ministers (OECD 2004). The number of core cabinet ministers only moderately reflects the real enlargement of patronage posts in the Zambian government. In 1968, President Kaunda appointed ministers for each of Zambia's nine provinces. After the introduction of the one-party state, the UNIP Central Committee became a parallel structure to the ministerial cabinet (van Donge 1995).

The President also created additional posts in order to pursue his policy of 'tribal balancing' in Zambia's multi-ethnic society (Carey 2002). Despite Zambia's severe and enduring economic crisis, originally caused by the sharply decreasing world-market prices of copper in the mid-1970s, the ministerial cabinet went up to a peak of 27 ministers (1986 to 1988) during the Second Republic. Furthermore, the 'UNIP patronage machine' (Bratton 1994) massively expanded public sector employment. Following Bates and Collier (1993), in 1985, the party filled over 40,000 public offices in Zambia's capital Lusaka alone. After the transition from the one-party state to multi-party rule and the formation of his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government in 1991, President Chiluba, also increased the totals which included Vice-Presidents, Deputy Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and Provincial Governors.

In assessing the average number of Cabinet members for sub-Saharan Africa, van de Walle (2001b) systematically excluded 'Heads of States'. He appointed 25 ministers to the Third Republic's first cabinet; a number which rose to an all-time high of 28 posts one year later. Even today the bloated government is a feature of Zambian politics. A 2004 media campaign to reduce the number of high-level government posts has remained unsuccessful. According to a Government of Zambia document, the total number of government members (President, Vice-President, Ministers and Vice-Ministers) on 3 August 2005 for instance, stood at 67 (Republic of Zambia 2005). In essence, this consistent use of the cabinet as a key locus for awarding personal favours by the 'big men' augments the argument for the dominance of neopatrimonial practices in Zambian politics.

### **Misuse of State Resources**

The misuse of state resources the third feature of neopatrimonialism, has also characterized Zambia's political practice. It can be assessed through the existence of special funds over which only the big man has discretion. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the similar World Bank Governance Index in respect to 'control of corruption' provide further evidence. Both are composite indices which incorporate various studies on a country's perceived incidence of corruption (Graf Lambsdorff 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2005a). Similar to other research, this article uses the existence of serious corruption levels as an indicator for the neopatrimonial misuse of state resources (Manow 2002; Basedau 2003). During the Second Republic, a Leadership Code obliged all cabinet and Central Committee members to separate public office and private interests (Kaunda 1972). Yet, the text of the code was not put into practice. A general pattern emerged of misusing public functions and resources. It became apparent that 'bribes and favours offered a host of rewards for "gatekeeping" services' (Szeftel, 2000).

Monitoring institutions such as the Anticorruption Commission remained toothless and the infrequent exposure of government malpractices did not counter the systematic misappropriation of public resources (Afronet 2002; Tordoff/Molteno 1974). President Chiluba's government also misused state resources, often to the advantage of the ruling party MMD (Szeftel 2000). According to Bratton and van de Walle term this facet 'use of state resources for political legitimation'. However, in all political systems governments 'use' state resources for securing their acceptance. The key difference is how and for what projects public resources are spent.

In addition to the general problem of sources, it is difficult to precisely compare the misuse of state resources between the Kaunda and the Chiluba administrations as these instances of neopatrimonial politics have been more easily uncovered in the multi-party Third Republic which allows for transparency International Zambia (TIZ), a number of ministers were involved in corruption scandals without being dismissed (TIZ 2002; TIZ 2003). Furthermore, Zambia has from 1998 to 2005 received low scores on Transparency International's CPI. The country always ranked in the worse half, for most of the time in the worst third of countries included in the index (Internet Center for Corruption Research 2005). Zambia's 'control of corruption' marks in the World Bank Governance Index have equally been low. The country has consistently featured among the third of countries perceived to be most corrupt (Kaufmann et al. 2005b). A similar 'blurring of the line' between the governing party and the state took place as in the Second Republic (Rakner/Svåsand 2005).

Before the 1996 elections, the government sold council houses to tenants at favourable conditions. Commentators largely perceived this move as an inducement to vote for the MMD (Financial Mail 27, 2002;

Bratton/Posner 1999). In 1999, the government created a 'Presidential Discretionary Fund', unofficially called 'Slush Fund', to distribute favours to clients. The fund's reserved budgetary allocations of around 12 billion Kwacha per annum (roughly US\$ 5 million at that time), were at the disposal of the President alone, who apparently deployed it for partisan purposes (Burnell 2001b; Simon 2005). In the face of these developments, President Mwanawasa began his tenure on 2 January 2002 by declaring his administration to be 'a government of laws not of men'. One of the centrepieces of his 'new deal' government was the proclaimed fight against corruption (Erdmann/ Simutanyi 2003; Simon 2005). He lifted the immunity of former President Chiluba and charged him and some of his allies with abuse of office. However, there are strong indications that President Mwanawasa's campaign has remained inconsequential and is primarily used as a way of silencing his opponents (TIZ 2002; EIU 2005). The misuse of state resources has remained a recurrent feature of Zambian politics. On balance, political practice in Zambia since independence in 1964 has been characterised by neopatrimonialism. Due to its inherent lack of accountability, the single-party state in the Second Republic seems to have reinforced the neopatrimonial impulse (Bratton 1994). Yet, it is striking to see the neopatrimonial continuity throughout the Third Republic after the abolition of single-party rule. This deeply ingrained system of neopatrimonialism has created a hostile environment for a rational-legal tax administration and the collection of stronger civil society, media and donor oversight than the Second Republic. The common perception that misuse of state resources was more rampant under President Chiluba's rule might therefore be an artefact caused by the different quality of sources.

### IX. THE ANC AND PATRIMONIALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa's ceding of membership of the BRICS amidst dysfunctional African regional blocs and the evaporation of the continental economic community vision cannot be dissociated from this country's twenty years of faded "civilizing" missions under the rubric of African Renaissance. At the national scale, recent popular uprisings against African regimes are indicative of the pervasiveness of personalized rule, powerfulness of "strong men" and "weak states". In fact, Pitcher et al. (2009) paradoxically conclude that "Many contemporary African leaders and the bureaucrats who serve them have consciously distorted history to justify dictatorial rule on national and local levels". At the core of this struggle is the scramble for unfettered personalized state rule and power which, ironically, entails public legitimization.

Following Jacob Zuma's ascension to the presidency in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) has been dogged by rumours of escalating corruption and the personalization of power. Increasingly within the ANC, leadership behaviour appears to be characterized by neo-patrimonial pre-dispositions and, while formal distinctions between private and public concerns are widely recognized, officials nevertheless use their public powers for private purposes. Other symptoms of neo-patrimonial political behaviour have also appeared. There is factionalism, that is, the emergence of internal rival groups constituted by personal loyalty rather than shared ideological beliefs. Another manifestation is the affirmation by the ANC leadership of 'traditionalist' representations of indigenous culture, whereby moral legitimation is sought more and more from appeals to 'Africanist' racial solidarity and nostalgic recollections of patriarchal social order rather than on the basis of the quality of government performance.

Neo-patrimonial indicators include the acquisition of business interests by leading politicians and their families, most notably the proliferation of the presidential family's business concerns since Jacob Zuma's accession to the presidency. Despoliation by local office holders through municipal and provincial tendering procedures began earlier. This was a consequence of the 'capture' of municipalities by informal networks that in the ANC's weaker regions could especially easily impose their influence over local branches. This kind of behaviour has been accompanied by sharpening competition for posts in government and within the party organization, which in turn has eroded the decorum that used to characterize the ANC's internal procedures. The ANC's leadership increasingly reinforces its authority and demonstrates its power through displays of ostentation and through elaborate security procedures.

Meanwhile, the ANC's mobilization of public support relies increasingly on patron-client relations, reminding us that patrimonial power must involve reciprocal exchanges, and, indeed, in contrast to the socially aloof. By March 2010 members of the Zuma family held 134 company directorships. Of the companies in Zuma's official declaration of interests, 83 were registered after Zuma became ANC president (Mail and Guardian, 2010). In a survey undertaken in the Eastern Cape in 2005, 27 percent of local government officials had witnessed the award of jobs or contracts to political allies (Atkinson, 2007).

Both grandiose ostentation and extreme security precautions are combined in the features of former President Zuma's residential estate at Nkandla in KwaZulu Natal where R250 million in public funds have been spent on protective arrangements. Disapproval of such measures is by no means universal. On learning that the leader of

the parliamentary opposition, Helen Zille, intended to visit Nkandla to inspect the project, the local inkosi (chief) expressed outrage. 'She was supposed to first consult traditional leaders before going to the President's home ... we have arrived at a point where we say enough of this disrespectful white girl.' (Sunday Times, 2012). A letter in City Press may express more widely shared views among the ANC's more partisan supporters: 'Zimbabwe has a life President and Angola is doing well, so this is the best route for us if we are to indigenize and deal with the land question. South Africa needs a big strong man to force things to happen (City Press, 2012).

Both within the ANC and in the wider political system patrimonial behaviour interacts with norms that reflect bureaucratic legal rationality as well as democratic procedures: that after all is the hallmark of a neo-patrimonial polity. Indeed, studies that have explored the ANC's base-level organization have documented key features of a mass-based party with a membership animated by political principles and horizontal ties of solidarity. This suggests that with respect to the typologies that are used to classify party organizations, the ANC still belongs to the broad family of mass-based parties, and this does make it unusual in the broader African context.

But the ANC's patrimonial characteristics are becoming more pronounced, and as a result the argument that South African politics represents an exception to the general trends that shape political life elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa is becoming less compelling. The behaviour of ANC leaders and their followers is beginning to correspond to conventions associated with clientelistic organizations, in which specific public services and resources are offered to particular groups in exchange for political support. At the rate that this behaviour is proliferating it threatens to overwhelm what used to be a relatively disciplined and well-structured political organization unified by beliefs about programmatic purpose and securing public support through ideological appeals to widely shared collective interests. The consequences of this for the party, its original mission, and South African democracy would be profound.

#### **The ANC's neo-patrimonialism as a colonial residue**

The exercise of patrimonial leadership in the modern ANC resonates with historically entrenched habits, norms, and expectations derived from colonial experience. This argument draws upon common explanations of African neo-patrimonialism that attribute its prevalence to the prolonged after-effects of colonialism. Here the state is an alien importation at odds or 'incongruent' with pre-existing norms and institutions. Colonial rule confined the legal rational sphere to a small privileged group residing in the administrative centre and most subjects lived under the rule of chiefs whose pre-colonial patrimonial powers were often amplified by colonial authority. In weak post-colonial states bureaucracy expanded very rapidly and 'was challenged and invaded from below by informal relationships'.

In the striking phraseology of Ekeh (1997), a new 'public realm' was created, 'in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual's public behaviour'. Ekeh's notion of a second public realm characterized by neo-patrimonial polities reminds us that personalized networks often function in a setting in which there is broad public approval of their operation. Networks constituted through family, kinship, and childhood friendship certainly played an important role in the formation of the ANC's founding elite. More arguably, such personalized networks continued thereafter to exercise profound influence.

The linkages that bound this elite were particularly important in a setting in which personal and public concerns were entwined. Members of the amakholwa shared the aim of 'managing' the introduction of modernity through leadership that would instil progress through 'Christian improvement and industrial education'. In this vision, their own social mobility at the helm of meritocratic hierarchy was the key to broader racial emancipation. In a colonial order in which their own private ambitions were under increasing threat it was easy to conflate personal interests with public concerns.

Turning to the ANC's later history, the ascendancy of an Eastern Cape elite, drawn primarily from Methodist converts and 'progressive' peasants and socialized through education at Healdtown and Fort Hare, has been very evident. Within this group, a shared sense of origin and familiarities derived from attending the same schools was bolstered through more intimate ties. As we know from Mandela's early life in Johannesburg, a 'home boy' network facilitated his early induction into the ANC as well as his placement in a legal firm, with his fellow clansman Walter Sisulu supplying the critical brokerage function. Nelson Mandela would cement his friendship with Sisulu through his first marriage, to Sisulu's cousin Evelyn Mase.

The success this elite enjoyed in reproducing its influence across generations is particularly obvious in the subsequent political progression of a talented cohort of younger Sisulus. Another entrenched source of patrimonial politics can be traced to the reflexes developed during the ANC's participation in official institutions that became hubs of clientelistic undertakings during apartheid. During the 1950s, despite resolutions to boycott township advisory board elections, plenty of ANC elders joined the boards and belonged to them.

Though formally consultative bodies, Advisory Boards could influence allocations of public goods: they were centres of clientelist politics and such kinds of political activity retained substantial public legitimacy through the 1960s. In general, though it is true that by the 1950s more radical ANC leaders and members were openly contemptuous of the Boards and favoured their boycott, this was not a universal position and in practice ANC leaders tolerated participation within them. Modern patrimonial reflexes within the ANC's leadership were partly the product of two features of the ANC's historical development. First, there were the networks of notables articulated by affective ties that established the organization. Schools, churches, and dynastic marriages helped to reproduce these networks and consolidate their power up to and through the 1950s, and still do so, though to a lesser extent. The second historic tributary are the clientelistic expectations nurtured through the ANC's engagement in Advisory Board politics in the 1940s and 1950s.

### **Neo-patrimonialism, state legitimation and institutional uncertainty**

The next set of explanations for the ANC's neo-patrimonial operations focus on the insecurities resulting from change. A common explanation for the persistence of patrimonial behaviour in ostensibly modern states –neo-patrimonialism –views it as the consequence of imposed modernization. What distinguishes this explanation from the first approach is its emphasis on organizational disarray and social insecurity. When institutions change there are no stable public realms in which people can find assurance and comfort. Under such conditions, corruption is an example of the way in which political actors use 'disorder as a political instrument'.

There is considerable evidence that the legacy of these relationships continues to shape ANC politics. At least two of the major corruption scandals in South Africa's post-democratic political history had their origins in symbiotic relationships that evolved between key ANC officials and business-men, some of the latter being individuals implicated in organized crime.

Criminal networks incorporated into the organization during its insurgent phase would certainly strengthen any patrimonial predispositions within the ANC's leadership. Their influence today might be accentuated by the ascent within the ANC hierarchy of a tightly knit group, composed of Jacob Zuma's former comrades within the ANC's intelligence section –that part of the organization most concerned with deploying criminal networks during the anti-apartheid struggle.

The ANC's organizational requirements during the political transition between 1990 and 1994 also help to explain the growing influence of personalized networks within it. For top leaders it was imperative to build organized political followings in areas where the ANC had little previous support. Indeed, the need to expand the organization's base into new territory may have had an even more profound effect on the ANC's prevalent norms and values than the opportunistic friendships that developed between certain of its officials and dishonest businessmen. To illustrate the point it is helpful to recall the manner of the ANC's organizational entrenchment into what was then the eastern Transvaal.

After 1994, the need to fund the party's organization also amplified the contribution of patronage and venality to its internal politics. Between 1990 and 1994, the ANC signalled its willingness to accept support from almost any source, no matter how morally compromised donors might have been by previous engagements with the earlier regime. Nelson Mandela's embrace of Sol Kerzner was a case in point. In this case, the ANC's lack of concern about venal associations was underlined by Mandela's retention within his cabinet of Stella Sigcau, the Transkeian minister implicated in a corruption case against Kerzner a decade earlier. Kerzner contributed R500, 000 to the ANC's electoral campaign in 1994. Mandela's actions supplied the template for future electoral fundraising (Sunday Times, 'Big wheels', 14 December 1997).

Since then, though, the ANC has become increasingly reliant on local funding sources. Accordingly, the ANC nurtures its relationship with the corporate world through initiatives that include the Progressive Business Forum, a body that sells access to key government ministers. Access to such resources enables the ruling party to maintain a very well-paid echelon of senior officials –raising the stakes in the competition for such offices –but it has also helped to instil a culture of 'gatekeeping', in which convivial meetings between businessmen and politicians are expected to be mutually rewarding. Moreover, through the ANC's efforts to

extend its influence in the business world by deploying its own cadres in key corporate positions, there has developed a sizeable group of businessmen who continue to view themselves as politicians.

One consequence of the development of an ANC oligarchy is the increasing role that private sources of wealth play within the ANC's internal politics. In 2012, Tokyo Sexwale, for example, was reported to be selling his stakeholding in the ABSA group to finance his 'war chest' for contesting the leadership elections at the ANC's national conference (City Press, 5 August 2012).

### **The ANC and the political economy of South Africa**

A third kind of explanation for the socio-political orientation of ANC's leadership is to view it as the reflection of deeply instilled characteristics of South Africa's political economy. Here neo-patrimonial politics reflects a particular level of economic development. From this perspective, neo-patrimonial political systems consolidate in environments in which the acquisition of political office represents the best avenue for personal accumulation, in settings where the emergence of local capitalist groups has been thwarted by the state.

Relational capital is accumulated through successive personal one-to-one encounters: the resulting affective ties facilitate wealth creation. In such cases, the key issue is that the accumulation requirement for relational capital makes it difficult for other groups to gather the resources needed to challenge the elite. Moreover its operation blunts the impact of external forces. Global economic actors have to work through local holders of relational capital and this limits the transformative potential of global firms. Political power derives from systems of economic control in which local ownership is highly concentrated –a situation that in Russia is the consequence of the economy's dependence on energy sales.

The ANC leadership has accepted that political connections, as business and economic prize, reign supreme over principles of "impartiality, fairness, public accountability, transparency, empowerment and effective use of resources" (Southall 2007). The evident contestations for party and state power among the ANC functionaries as well the unflinching application of state apparatus to settle such scores conclusively point to the prevalence of a neo-patrimonial logic wherein the "weak state" is governed by "strong man" regimes. According to Boas (2003), "the neo-patrimonial post-colonial state has created a state that is both strong and weak simultaneously"; as a result, there exist "remarkably stable regimes" governing weak states in Africa. Hence, questions of whether the ANC ruling elite would win subsequent national elections should be firmly planted on ice for the foreseeable future.

It is an unpalatable truth that contemporary South Africa's state governance has focused on personal power, patronage, clientelism and, perhaps, corruption. National politics are firmly captivated by state control of resources and power of the governing regimes, and the ruling elites' apparent reluctance to uphold civic virtues, democratic principles and ideals. Rather than focus on "order-inducing properties" of a democratic state, the ANC governing regimes have in recent times struggled for control over the neopatrimonial state and the rampant pursuit of "personal power and prestige". In practice, the ANC-led neo-patrimonial state has created a sense of virility of regime legitimacy and state sovereignty, both nationally and internationally, in order to bolster engagement of "nominal and non-threatening democracy".

## **X. CONCLUSION**

Neopatrimonialism is the vertical distribution of resources that gave rise to patron-client networks based around a powerful individual or party. Once argued to be necessary for unification and development after decolonization, these regimes have supplanted the role of the inherited colonial institutions for the benefit of a few individuals. In addition, the persistence of neopatrimonialism, institutions are hardly built, rather strong individuals bestride the continent. This is a threat to governance as governance runs better on institutions.

It is significant nowadays because it affects almost all sub-Saharan states to differing degrees and is not regarded as corrupt behaviour by the population, who rely on the system for their own survival. Neopatrimonialism affects policy making, especially development projects, and is responsible for the misuse of aid and state budgets.

The emergence of strong personality bestriding the political landscapes of African states like colossus have been at low ebbs. Thus, rather than witness the emergence of strong institutions in the continent, the strong personalities have eclipsed the growth and development of political institutions like the Lilliputians. Beyond the abstract use of the term 'patrimonialism' and its variants appended with prefix "neo-" or adjectives "modern" or "traditional", the leadership challenges in Africa manifesting in festering governance crisis has not benefitted from the deserved scholarly debate in a particularized manner.

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