

“Motions of Support and the Mobilization of the Ruling Class in Cameroon”

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ABSTRACT:- This article analyzes the collective action of the ruling class, manifested by the motions of support in Cameroon. These motions of support are brought by dominant actors with diverse profiles, made up of the, political, economic, traditional and intellectual elite. In this collective mobilization, the resources that these actors put forward are important: position in the state and partisan apparatus, financial power, traditional nobility and clientelism. This analysis is based on the theory of resource mobilization and empirical data to apprehend motions of support as a conservative mobilization of dominant actors in their quest for institutional rent in order to strengthen their hegemonic position in a democratic context full of political uncertainty.

Keywords: motions of support, social movement, collective action, ruling class and Cameroon

I. INTRODUCTION

When we examine the impressive literature that constitutes the sociology of collective action or social movements today, it is clear that there is little scientific interest that seems to have aroused in the study of the mobilizations of dominant actors. While there are certainly marginal studies on the mobilization of the ruling class (Pinçon, Monique Pinçon-Charlot, 2003; Pinçon, Pinçon-charlot, 2007; Offerlé, 2009; Agrikoliansky, Annie Collovald, 2014, pp. 7-29), they represent only rare exceptions insusceptible to compete vis-a-vis the monumental scientific productions on the protest mobilizations dominated groups (Read as an indication, Geschiere, Der Klei, 1987, pp. 297-340; Marche, 2003, pp. 41-52 ; Sommier, 2004; Mouchard, 2009; Braconnier, Mayer, 2015; Richaud, 2017; Manirakisa, 2020, pp271-301). Without being able to establish here an exhaustive inventory of the subjects addressed by the sociology of social movements, we can note that the dominant paradigm relates mainly to subaltern studies (Gyanendra Pandey, 1995, pp. 223-242) and / or popular modes of political action (Toulabor, 1981, pp. 55-71; Mbembé, 1988; Bayart, Mbembé and Toulabor, 1992). This study at the crossroads of political sociology, the sociology of mobilizations and the sociology of international relations is a contribution to the debate on the collective action of dominant actors based on a case study of motions support in Cameroon.

After three decades of authoritarianism, the 1990s could be seen as a moment of the renewal of social movements in Cameroon (Assana, 2020). We are witnessing the emergence of new forms of collective action in the public space. Along with the resurgence of memoranda that mix up vulnerable ethno-regional categories (Assana, 2014)we observe the massification of the uses motions of support which seem to stage the dominant groups. Between 2009 and 2011, around 569 motions of support were sent to President Paul Biya (See Biya, 2009; Biya, 2010; Biya, 2011 cited by Assana, 2020: 200). From the effect of numbers, we understand that motions of support harbor the diffusion of a particular form of collective action. The choice of Cameroon as the field of empirical observation of the collective action of dominant groups is particularly interesting, because

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these motions of support have taken on a phenomenal scale in this state, as evidenced by their numerical growth. The study of this political phenomenon is essential if we want to understand the mode of operation of the state in Cameroon, its political system, as in general, informal modalities of strengthening political power or domination². Nevertheless, such a diagnosis requires that we first agree on the understanding of the object studied. The concepts of supportive motions and social movement need to be clarified.

Motions of support and calls for candidates refer to “practices through which individual or, more generally, collective actors display their loyalty to Paul Biya. By these acts, they urge him to stand again as a candidate for the supreme office” (Read on this point, Manga, 2018, p.142; Menguele Menyengue, 2019, pp452-453; Assana, 2020, p.198). Motions of support are defined in this study as a social movement. In essence, a social movement is a collective enterprise which brings together several actors and organizations positioning themselves to challenge an established order or, conversely, to promote its maintenance by opposing change (Neveu, 2002, p.8-9; Mathieu, 2002; Mario Diani, Doug Mc Adam, 2003). It is a form of collective action, that is to say an action carried out by several individuals at the same time, in a concerted way, and intentionally (which distinguishes collective action in the sociological sense of the term from a simple sum of individual actions not concerted among themselves, such as for example traffic jam³. Seen from this angle, the motions of support can then be understood as a defensive collective action, a resistance to a protest action calling into question the state of the political system in place by (part of Cameroonians from the diaspora and the international community).

These definitions being posed: what are the profiles of the actors or carriers of the motions of support? And what are the expected political rewards? To answer it, we formulate the hypothesis that the motions of support participate in a conservative mobilization of dominant actors with various profiles made up of the political, economic, traditional and intellectual elite, in their quest for institutional rents in order to preserve their position. of power in Cameroon in a democratic context, the bearer of political uncertainty.

This approach is based on the theory of resource mobilization (see Zald, et, Carthy, 1975; Neveu 2002). This theory is used to study support motions as a strategy for mobilizing the ruling class. To check this hypothesis, this study is based on the analysis of newspaper archives, documents produced by political actors (motions of support and calls for candidates). The empirical material is based on direct observation, semi-structured interviews with political authorities (belonging both to the party in power and to competing political groups), administrative authorities, traditional authorities, religious authorities, leaders of civil society, ordinary citizens and from the diaspora. The field surveys were carried out in two phases. The first phase took place from June 10 to December 20, 2019 in Europe (Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland ...), with Cameroonians in the diaspora during our scientific stay of 06 months in the city of Freiburg (Germany) as part of the grant awarded by the Alexandre Humboldt Foundation. The second phase took place from February 1 to July 30, 2020 in the capitals, regions (Yaoundé, Douala, Bafoussam, Bertoua, Ebolowa, Garoua) and departments (Meiganga, Ngaoundéré 1er) of Cameroon. The choice of these locations is motivated not only by the intensity of political activities but also by political stability. The discussion of the data collected gave rise to two types of concerns. The first analyzes motions of support as a repertoire of collective action of the dominant class (I). The second articulation sees them as an instrument for consolidating the governing order (II) in Cameroon.

II. MOTIONS OF SUPPORT: A REPERTOIRE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION OF THE RULING CLASS IN CAMEROON

Motions of support are very old practices that emerged between the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe⁴. These political practices emerged in the years 1967 and 1983 in Cameroon in the context of building the nation-state. Nevertheless, if they know a strong propaganda under the regime of Paul Biya, the motions of support nevertheless update a political practice which already flourished under Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first President of the Republic of Cameroon (1960/1982) (Pigeaud, 2011, p .169; Manga, 2018, p.142). This is the place to remember that at the outset, Paul Biya was not in favor of motions of support, which he saw as a political maneuver by pressure groups (Bandolo, 1986). In the heat of the presidential elections of 1992 and 1997, when the government faced stiff opposition from the opposition, there were no calls for candidates and motions of

²We subscribe to the thesis according to which, in Sub-Saharan Africa, it always seems illusory to read political reality from the institutional facade, as the state is characterized rather by a weak institutionalization (See Conac, 1983, p121-130 ; Sandrook, 1987, p.15-37 cited by Alawadi, 2017, p.373).

³In a certain sense, the "crowd" is in fact associated with the unorganized, the uncontrollable, and therefore with the risk of riots and outbursts. On this question, read Tarde, 1989 (1901); Le Bon, 2003 (1895) cited by Dormagen, Mouchard, 2010, p.214).

⁴To the best of our knowledge, motions of support have emerged in England (Read Bernard, 2003, p.158 cited by Assana, 2020, p.224).

support. We have to wait until the eve of the 2004 presidential election, in circumstances that have (re) become favorable to the ruling party, to see them (again) unfold (Manga, 2018, p.142). But they are starting to become routine in the liberal context. To better understand the motions of support as a repertoire of collective action of the dominant class, it is first of all important to analyze their organizational structure, the profiles of the actors and the modes of elaboration (A) before exploring their discursive content (B).

1. Analysis of the organizational structure, the profiles of the actors and the methods of development

The first elements of the motions of support which are available for observation are: the organizational structure, the profiles of the actors and their modes of development. These elements are a "political montage" (Legendre, 1998), where nothing is left to chance. These motions of support participate in the mobilization of the ruling class in two ways: through their organizational structure (1), the profiles of the signatories and their mode of development (2).

1.1. The organizational structure

Drawing inspiration from Jean-Marcelin Manga's analysis of calls for candidates, the organizational structure of motions of support reveals at least seven (7) elements (Manga, 2018: 144). First of all, we have an opening antiphon in which the actors of the motions of support state their (political) identity. By browsing them, we can regularly see the reference to the We:

We, members of the Central Committee, of the CPDM, Member of the National Assembly, Mayor, President and Presidents, active forces, militant sympathizers and activists of the WCPDM (Women's Organization of the Cameroon People Democratic Movement) and CPDM Bamboutos sub-sections Center II.... The use of the first-person plural "we" as broad inclusion is not a trivial matter in the analysis of the organizational structure of motions of support. Identity work is accomplished first of all in the intensive use of "us" which expresses "the ideal of a perfectly united community" (Le Bart, 1998, p. 87). It helps build buy-in from a large part of the population through the formulation of us. In other words, motions of support do not abandon themselves to a random reception, they invite their recipients to adopt a precise identity posture, by reference to an ideological family or when it emanates from elected decision-makers, by reference to the territory. managed (municipality, department (nationals of the department of..., region, state). In the latter case, it works to disseminate feelings of territorialized identity. In general, motions of support are a rite of manifestation of unity of a political family (Abeles, pp151-157 cited by Sindjoun, 1993, p.829), a way of presenting the self-supporter and distinction between them and us (Goffman, 1973, pp. 11-24). It is a theatrical act by which political families put on a show of cohesion (Sindjoun, 1993, p.829). The quest for legitimacy is a constant concern of political actors (Le Bart, 1998, p.77). In this quest for legitimacy, the reference to allows us the carriers of said motions of support to act as spokespersons, representatives or representatives of their ethno-regional group; given that in the language of sociology, it is the representative spokesperson who makes the group, in that of politics, it is the group which gives itself a representative (LE Bart., 2003). The representative makes the group that makes the representative (See Offerle, 1994). This phenomenon is particularly widespread with the appearance of bearers of community voice, ethno-regional representatives in the context of the democratization of the 1990s in Cameroon. The second phase corresponds to the interpellation of the recipient (the President of the Republic to whom this prayer is directed). A third moment is identifiable. The justification for the initiative launched very often praising the favors which the country, the region, the socio-professional category concerned (received from the President during his previous mandate). The fourth step highlights the thanks addressed to the President of the Republic. After having reaffirmed their "unwavering support" in the fifth stage, the sixth firmly urges the President to seek a new term by guaranteeing him a "total victory". The list of signatories, who are generally large in number, closes the appeal. It is therefore necessary to study the profiles of the actors and the methods of developing motions of support.

1.2. The profiles of the actors and the methods of development

The objective of this section is to study the profiles of the actors of the motions of support and their modes of development. By examining the socio-professional identity of the signatories of support motions, we find ourselves in the presence of an "advocacy coalition" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999 cited by Hassenteufel, 2008, p.132), dominant social groups, made up of several categories of actors (public and private): the political, economic, intellectual and traditional elite. Moreover, it is the staff of the CPDM or senior state officials which occupy the first line in the numerical order of the signatories of the motions of support. For illustration, we can refer to the call for the candidacy of President Paul Biya initiated in 2018, by the forces of the regions of the 'Extrême-Nord, du Nord et de l'Aamaoua' (Cameroon Tribune, du Tuesday, February, 2016: p: 5). Among the signatories, we note the predominance of the following political figures: Cavaye Yeguié Djibril (Traditional leader and President of the National Assembly); Ayang Luc (President of the Economic and Social

Council); Aboubakar Abdoulaye (Lamido de Rey and Vice-President of the Senate); Ahmadou Ali (Minister responsible for relations with the Assembly); Alhadji Abbo Mohamadou Ousmanou (economic operator); Ms. Youssouf Hadidja Alim (Minister of Basic Education) etc. This is the place to observe that there is precedence in the ranking of signatories. From a protocol point of view, Cavaye Yégiué Djibril who is the head of the list of signatories of this motion of support, is also the first political personality of the northern part of Cameroon and ensures, depending on the circumstances of the moment, the leadership of all this part from the country⁵. We also observe the strong presence of intellectual elites (Cameroon Tribune, N° 11451/7650 of October 13, 2017: 7⁶). This strong presence of the intellectual elite reveals the importance of the expert dimension in the fabrication of motions of support, that is, the use of knowledge for political decision-making. This reflects the wider process of "technicization" (Cf Barthe, Callon, Lascoumes, 2001) of Cameroonian political society. Drawing inspiration from the work of Roberto Michels (2002) on the "iron law of oligarchies", we observe that the motions of support in their configuration, known in their midst the formation of an oligarchy, that is to say - to say a ruling elite with "specific qualities", which distinguish it from the rest of the population, confiscating the initiative of motions of support for their benefit. After analyzing the organizational structure, it is important to study the ways in which motions of support are developed.

How do you develop a motion of support? The question was asked to some activists of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), political party in power and of the oppositional class during our field investigations in Cameroon. The answers tend to differ. According to the political opponent Prosper Nkou Vondo, former Secretary General of the CPDM section of Vina, converted into the political party UNIVERS for whom:

Motions of support or appeals are an individual construction which is scripted as collective by its carriers. Motions of support are never written in a political meeting. As a rule, the motion of support is conceived some time before a political event. There is always one or more initiators of motions of support. Very often it is an individual (an influential political figure) who initiates and signs the motions of support on behalf of activists, forces and elites. external and internal, even the Cameroonian people. Without having requested the opinion of the populations, the signatories claim to align themselves with the current public reflections on issues of national and / or international interest. This personality puts the names of people who are loyal to him, drawing from the elite bank which is held by the CPDM (dominant party), the prefectural and the intelligence services. She excludes those who are rebellious to her. It is a lever that local political actors in connection with central actors activate to position themselves or maintain themselves in the political field. It is an instrument of griotism, courtesy and the quest for political visibility. The aim is to make the supreme political decision-maker believe that his ethno-regional base is with him. Usually, the main carrier of motions of support and / or appeals occupies a legally defined status of authority, either at the state level or that of a particular organization (the political party). Indeed, the political actors who are conferred a power ("competences" often take a speech act to their political convenience. A Head of government, a Minister, a parliamentarian, a Mayor, an apparition (member of the Political Bureau and or the Central Committee), often have the opportunity to speak at their political convenience. He is a political figure who has a bit of power, and who can hardly be contested in a social context of generalized impoverishment which carries the motions of support; it being understood that it can distribute: prebends, award public contracts to economic operators, positions, ensure success in the competition, provide jobs for students in the institutional mafia. No one can deny her the paternity of a motion of support, given the institutional function she occupies. In other words, he is an unpopular political figure who uses institutional means of political, administrative and economic seduction and intimidation for political control. Also, she wants to see this political speech credited with ethno-regional weight. The signatories of the motions of support are scattered throughout the country, but their bearers manage to synchronize their presences, it is not clear by what political alchemy. Everything suggests that those supporting motions of support append an old list, that they do not always take the time to update it. An incongruity posed by motions of support is that of the signatories. Motions of support are marred by the names of the deceased in the list of signatories⁷. In addition, the sincerity of motions of support and calls for candidatures coming from localities

⁵We recently saw him at the head of the delegation of northern elites, mobilized to lead the fight against the Islamist sect Boko Haram which is rampant on the borders of this part of the country. Before that, Cavaye Yégiué Djibril was received by the President of the Republic Paul Biya, on behalf of all the elite of the northern part, to respond to the grievances expressed by this elite relating to the representativeness of students from North Cameroon in the École Normale Supérieure de Maroua which had just been created. Read on this perspective of analysis, Alawadi Zelao, 2017, p. 374-375

⁶See the appeal of CPDM activists from Mefou and Akono.

⁷By way of illustration, in the text of support for the President of the Republic of Cameroon published on March 13 in the columns of the government daily Cameroon Tribune, appears the name of Benjamin Gérard Assouzo'o

"forgotten" by the regime or conquered by the opposition is questionable. It is in Ngaoundéré where the NUDP is the dominant political party. Motions of support are drafted by outside elites who are cut off from the social realities of the hinterland. Between the spectacular displays in the motions of support and the unofficial ideological postures of the actors of the motions of support, there is a gap (Interview of 03/05/2020 in Ngaoundere).

This informant's argument draws its legitimacy from the arbitrary and authoritarian nature of the way in which motions of support are developed. The legitimacy of those supporting motions of support is questionable. Another informant apprehends motions of support more like:

An initiative of a small group of elites in search of ethno-regional leadership. It is a charming operation and a positioning game that aims to demonstrate the strong capacity for local mobilization of political entrepreneurs in search of political visibility. In the dynamics of motions of support, reluctance or the suspicion of the slightest reservation is assimilated to opposition to the presidential figure, in the name of the popular saying: "whoever is not with the leader is against". In this way, opposing or expressing disagreements to motions of support are also made difficult to externalize. It becomes preferable to give pledges of loyalty or even loyalty political vis-à-vis the regime, its adherence to motions of support. Likewise, we subtract the name of a political figure visible enough to make it clear to the recipient (the President of the Republic) that she has boycotted participation in the development of motions of support. The aim is to label her as an opponent who flirts with certain political parties in the opposition. There are deliberate omissions of the names of some influential political elites from the list of signatories. In reality, this voluntary omission of certain names is part of a ploy to disqualify political competitors. It is a bargaining operation around political visibility (Interview of 12/06/2020 in Douala).

In light of the above, it can be seen that motions of support are actions that are taken under the influence of emotion and political passion. They are not always rational. Thus, the drafting and signing of the text of motions of support is the subject of internal rivalries. They are structured by the friend / foe dialectic (Schmitt, 1982). The consideration of antagonistic logics situates support motions as a "balance of tensions" (Elias, 1994). In fact, the promoters of the motions of support, as interest groups, assume a role in the oversight mechanism through the continuous monitoring of the various participants, the whistleblowing procedures they can initiate and political sanctions. In 2008, seeing with a dim view a possible (re) candidacy of Paul Biya for the 2011 presidential election, Mr. Henri Engoulou, former Minister of Finance Delegates in charge of the Budget, had thus refused to sign, during a political rally held in Monatélé, to affix his signature to a declaration of support. Some believed to see in this attitude the origin of his political disgrace which occurred two years later (Manga, 2018, p. 149). However, among our informants, only one seems to hold a different story. For Edmond Biloa, academic and CPDM activist:

Motions of support and calls for candidatures sanction political events. By way of illustration, it could be a political party rally, an election campaign launch or a section opening rally. You can also make a motion of support at the end of a political seminar. The CPDM is a large mass party, therefore not all activists in a section, in a subsection can draft a motion of support. It is essential that a group of people draft the motions of support. There are professionals who are appointed to draft support motions. Usually, these are people who master administrative correspondence such as university teachers, retired civil administrators etc. When activists in a section send motions of support to the National President of the CPDM, all fellow activists assume paternity. It is not only the hierarchy or the visible signatories which are: The Ministers, the Directors General, the Rectors, the Vice-Rectors, the university teachers, the engineers, the political professionals etc. These motions of support demonstrate the commitment of activists to the party leadership. This attachment must be constantly renewed. The grassroots must express their attachment to the party hierarchy. Conversely, the hierarchy must work to meet the needs of the base. And so, there is a communicating vase relationship between the hierarchy and the base. Motions of support constantly renew this relationship. As the President of the Republic said at the last congress: "the CPDM is not a party of the General Staff". When we observe the emotional manifestation of the base vis-à-vis the hierarchy of the political party and the demands of the hierarchy vis-à-vis the base, we realize that there is solidarity between the top and the bottom. However, given that motions of support are drafted some time before political events, it is possible that the list of signatories from the elite bank may be taken, they are renewed, without proceeding to the grooming or updating of the list of signatories of motions of support beforehand. It is also not excluded that in good faith, the name of an influential politician is omitted. These omissions can be counted as clerical errors. In addition, between the drafting of motions of support and their publication, deaths can occur. It can also happen that some elites do not see their name on the list of signatories of the motions of support and, they claim. Very often there is an additive list. The CPDM is a democratic party. Whenever activists feel uncomfortable, then they express their political discomfort. When they are right, then

Bella, Director of Marketing and Communication at Cameroon Telecommunication (CAMTEL) and activist of the CPDM. However, he died on January 15, 2019 in Yaoundé.

they are not censored. However, protests must be made within a strictly regulatory framework. The activists are not detractors of the CPDM. However, it is important that party discipline is respected (Interview of July 27, 2020 in Ngaoundéré).

The objectification of the above, makes it possible to observe that the motions of support participate in a political technology of mobilization which reflects the dynamics of the Democratic Rally of the Cameroonian People (CPDM), of the "state party". In the imagination and intention of political actors, motions of support are underpinned by the principle of political representation. It is a reflection of social structuring. But, this thesis is relativized by some informants. This is the case of Serge Levoa Awono, an apolitical citizen for whom: Motions of support are more of an elitist construct; it being understood that in absolute terms, one cannot say that there is a direct and close relationship between the top and the bottom, between the leadership of the political party and the militants. There are always relays that always overshadow the people, the entire population to be most visible in the eyes of the Prince and to maintain their positions of power. It would be difficult to consider motions of support on a lower scale. It would be more complicated. The further down we go, the more we dive into uncertainty, that is, we cannot control the reactions of the masses. In other words, the more we involve the mass (the lower classes), the more we run the risk of having positions of dissent. Motions of support are a weapon for people and personalities who have positions of power and who intend to consolidate or preserve them. But when you hold people by decree as is the case with the political-administrative bureaucracy and Members of Government, then it creates a direct bond of allegiance. It is an act of allegiance to the Central Head of the political system. Any leader, to govern needs loyal people (Interview of July 30, 2020 in Meiganga).

Observation of reality shows that motions of support cannot fully reflect the aspirations of the masses. Besides the influence of dominant actors in shaping motions of support, these political practices have remained an urban phenomenon. Political events are polarized in urban centers (regional and departmental capitals). Nevertheless, the size of signatories of motions of support can be incorporated as an additional variable to explain the effectiveness of motions of support. According to Olson Mancur's famous thesis, large groups are less effective than small groups at achieving their goals. The main argument used by this author is that the incentives to behave like a stowaway are all the stronger that the size of the group in question is large (Mancur, 1965). Hence the extreme selectivity of the list of signatories of motions of support. The interactions between state and society, between rulers and ruled reveal the centrality and monopoly of the political, economic, traditional and intellectual elite in the process of developing support motions. In these political transactions, the actors of the motions of support put forward important resources: the position in the state and partisan apparatus, the institutional function, the financial power, the traditional nobility, clientelism etc. The analysis of mobilization centers on the ways in which groups acquire resources and make them usable for collective action (Tilly, 1978, p.7). Despite the plurality and diversity of profiles of the actors involved in the production of motions of support and the unequal endowment of resources, we observe the deep unity of the ruling class, based on the existence of the community of objectives⁸. In addition to the organizational structure, the profiles of the signatories and the modes of development of motions of support, the discursive content of motions of support must be studied.

2. The discursive content of motions of support

To analyze the discursive content of motions of support, it is important to use the concept of "interpretive framework" or "framing"⁹. Within the framework of this study, the investigation is interested in the various operations of construction of the activity of framing of motions of support. Unlike calls for candidates, motions of support cover a specifically broad thematic field¹⁰. In addition to national and international political

⁸ Motions of support relativize the dichotomy between the monist thesis and the pluralist thesis. On the synthesis of this controversy, read Wright, 1956; Kessler, 1979 cited by Braud, 2004, p.567 and 569).

⁹ The framing activity comes down to constructing, about a specific situation or problem, a definition of reality and an "identification of the event" that can be shared by a group, in this case the group mobilized (see Goffman, 1991).

¹⁰ The difference between motions of support and calls for candidates is perceptible in terms of content. In fact, the motions of support generally reflect the adhesion of the political, economic, traditional and intellectual elite and the CPDM militants and to a lesser extent of the people to the policy or the political program defined and implemented. by the Central Head of the political system (the President of the Republic) and particularly one or more aspects of this policy which is called into question by the oppositional class, the international community or the Cameroonians from the diaspora. In other words, they are the instruments for legitimizing national and international public policies. In contrast, the calls for candidates revolve around the electoral process and the incitement of the central chief executive to stand again for the presidential election. To be more precise, motions of support have a maximalist perspective, while calls for candidates have a minimalist perspective. Basically,

legitimization as we will see in the second part, Paul Biya's exhortation to continue certain actions undertaken in the context of the fight against corruption, embezzlement of public funds, terrorism, the socio-economic crisis. politics in the regions of North-West and South-West, "the condemnation of the campaign of denigration of the Head of State", the preservation of peace, stability, national unity, diplomatic victories etc., we can systematize the discursive content of the motions of support around two main points: the sanctification of his political figure of Paul Biya (1) and the laudatory assessment of the regime in place (2).

2.1. The sanctification of the political figure of Paul Biya

The reference to God is an important element in determining the discursive content of the motions of support addressed to Paul Biya. So, we can read in the motions of support for the whiff of political messianism published on July 21, 2006 by the elites and activists of the Ntem Valley in the South region:

We activists and supporters of the CPDM, WCPDM and YCPDM sections (...), internal and external elites and the populations of the Ntem Valley, Considering the multiple present and future challenges facing Cameroon; renew to you our unfailing support for the program of great ambitions (...); pray Almighty God to grant you even more than in the past health, wisdom, clairvoyance and longevity at the head of the CPDM and the State of Cameroon¹¹.

It is quite striking how strongly most of the motions of support are imbued with the figure of sacredness. In the practical modalities of political modulation of intercessory prayer, prayers for the President of the Republic are recurrent. The observation shows that, when an ethno-regional group has benefited from presidential munificence, in particular when a presidential decree promotes one of their own to a position of strategic power within the high administration of the State, the group thus honored offers symbolic counter-gifts in return. Prayers of intercession are one of them. Generally, those promoted by the presidential decree often manage to organize ecumenical services, thanksgiving cults or support marches to stage these "political liturgies" which make it possible to raise prayers in favor of the holder of the power of nomination (Mengué Menyengue, 2020, p.235-236). For example, following his appointment to the post of Minister of the Civil Service and Administrative Reform following the government reorganization of March 2, 2018, Joseph Anderson LÉ organized a thanksgiving mass on Saturday April 7, 2018 at the Cathedral of the Holy Family of Bertoua. This quickly turned into a political rally of support and thanks to the President of the Republic. The promoted took advantage of this religious service to invite the audience to pray for the Head of State to "return the elevator to him" (Read Le Messenger n° 5047 of Tuesday April 10, 2018: 5; General News, of Tuesday April 10, 2018). Co-optation in the Government is not a disinterested gift, it presupposes in the presidential logic the counter-gift of collective recognition translated by massive support for the regime.

What is at work here is the desire for religious sanctification of the Central Head of the political system. The *modus operandi* is to raise the specter of the collapse of the state without the presidential figure embodied by the person of Paul Biya. This reference to God not only translates the irrepressible primacy of sacredness in the contemporary political context but also the political will of "messianization" of the highest political authority in Cameroon. As a Cameroonian informant from the diaspora notes:

We are in the Bantu African universe, which is a very religious setting par excellence. Without subscribing to the Eurocentric prejudices that have prevailed in the past according to which blacks have a magico-religious mentality, we believe that this is partly true. The irrational is extremely pervasive in the African universe. Likewise, the political has not really shed the shadow of the sacred. Secularism is not synonymous with agnosticism, that is to say the repudiation of God, we have simply separated the same rooms in the same house. Power has never ceased to be sacred. Moreover, what makes democracy so weak is that it is a regime of trivialization of the sacred. It is an impregnable dimension of politics. What contributes to the loss of the politician is the trivialization of the figure of power. The politician has all the more the chance to eternalize in the hearts when he mobilizes the figure of messianism. Recourse to religion as a resource for legitimation is perceptible in speech, attitudes, postures, during events or commemorations. It should be noted that the work of legitimation is constantly taking place in a competitive universe where the figures of legitimation and rationalizations are plural; even if, the resources invested and the objects of appropriation are the same (Interview of 06/08/2019 in Paris).

In view of the foregoing, the thesis of the acceleration of the process of secularization or deconfessionalization in modern societies, that is to say of the empowerment of the society of religious tutelage, should be put into perspective (Berger, 1967). The questioning of the paradigm has been accentuated since the 1990s. Today we are more likely to speak of the European exception. On a world scale, we cannot speak of secularization, as

the two instruments fit into two different registers, even if there are similarities in their organizational structure (Interview of 09/09/2020 with Mr. Atemengue, 3rd degree traditional chef in Yaoundé).

¹¹We can also note by way of illustration, extracts posted in Cameroon-tribune, n° 11614/7813 of Monday, June 11, 2018: 10, and Cameroon-tribune, n° 11614/7813 of Monday, June 11, 2018: 11.

Africa, Asia and Latin America remain, or even become more and more, deeply religious (Sindjoun, 2001). Nevertheless, the contemporary mobilization of the religious phenomenon within the framework of motions of support does not contradict the extent of secularization. They simply force us to reconsider what the phenomenon of secularization itself is: not as a process of erasing religion in a massively rationalized society, but as a process of recomposing religion¹². In addition to the sanctification of the political figure, the motions of support are part of a glowing record of the regime in place.

2.2. A glowing review of the regime in place

Motions of support fall within these "arts of doing" (De Certeau, 1990): it is a matter of "tinkering" with an admissible statement, drawing on the available legitimate vocabulary. The study of "syntactic embedding" thus shows that the writers of the motions of support draw on the available repertoires to say what they say, repertoires adjusted to the accomplishment (s) of the regime in place. From the summary of the motions of support studied, it appears that they are addressed to Paul Biya to praise "his peaceful accession to the supreme office which has favored the promotion, development and completion of political pluralism"; "Praise its political options of austerity and moralization"; "Its policy of great ambitions, manifested by its firm commitment to the fight against poverty, the well-being of the Cameroonian populations, corruption" and; "To recall the indisputable successes, achieved under its high impetus" by Cameroon "on the international scene at the political, economic, social and cultural levels". These motions of support also insist on the realization of material infrastructures which allow development opportunities, the promotion or the maintenance in important functions of one or more "worthy sons of their land" (Cameroon Tribune, n ° 11597/7796). In short, it is about producing an "idealized impression" (Le Bart, 1998, p.44-45) of the regime in place. These motions of support are intended to highlight the positive facts, to make people forget the negative facts (euphemization of social problems, corruption scandals or financial embezzlement which tarnishes the image of the regime in place) and to tinker with a relationship. of minimally probable causality between the deciding self and the observed reality. The carriers of motions of support carefully choose the most rewarding indicators in terms of politics, employment, etc., in order to first transform social reality into positive reality, then in the balance sheet of the Head of State and the regime in place. In this perspective, they tend to erase the traces of conflictual, disparities and internal tensions" (Krieg-Planque, 2012). However, the analysis of the organizational structure, the profiles of the actors, the mode of development and the discursive content of the motions of support is not sufficient to define the complexity of the motions of support. It is still necessary to study their political functions.

III. MOTIONS OF SUPPORT: AN INSTRUMENT FOR CONSOLIDATING THE GOVERNING ORDER IN CAMEROON

The political order is an order in tension, legitimacy is never acquired once and for all. Legitimacy needs to be constantly renewed. It is a quest that is never complete. As Georges Balandier observes:

Power established on force alone, or on untamed violence, would have a constantly threatened existence; power exposed under the sole light of reason would have little credibility. It does not manage to maintain itself either by brutal domination or by rational justification. It is only made and conserved by the transposition, by the manipulation of symbols and their organization in a ceremonial framework. These operations are carried out according to variable and combinable modes of presenting society and legitimizing governing positions (Balandier, 1980, p.16).

The essential fragility of the bases of popular consent to domination requires power to build the conditions of its acceptability through perpetual work of anchoring in the imaginary "(Assana, 2020. P 239). Thus, in a complex environment of "the rise of democracy as a subject of international concern" (Ketchu, 2004; Lorey et al, 2019, pp. 89-105), the public authorities are forced to resort to "power" (Foucault, 1994 cited by Assana, 2020, p.). This is so, because it is necessary that between the symbols solicited in the demonstration of power and the beliefs of which individuals are carriers, there is what Robert Escarpit calls "a common mythology" (Onana, 2009, p. 45 cited by Ibid). It refers to what Michel Foucault calls the work of acquiring consent (Foucault, 1984). In fact, democratization is not a form of domination like any other, it wants to be legitimate, accepted by the "people" through the procedures of expression of consent: "it is a voluntary servitude" (Sindjoun, 1999, p.31). On analysis, the motions participate in an instrument of internal (A) and international (B) political legitimization.

1. An instrument of internal political legitimation

The analysis of motions of support as an instrument of internal political legitimation calls for the questioning of the expected rewards for participating in motions of support. The models constructed to explain individual participation in collective mobilizations stress the complexity of expectations and the methods of

¹²To break the deadlock, theorists have developed a more nuanced conceptualization of secularization, usefully read (David, 2005).

calculating expected interests (Muller and Opp, 1986; Opp, 1986 cited by Lapeyronnie, 1988, p.607; Eithan Orkibi, 2015). The analysis of the cost / benefit ratio of engagement in collective action positively replaces the hypotheses on frustration (Gurr, 1970) or irrationality (Gabriel Tarde, 1989; Georges Lebon, 2003 cited by Dormagen and Mouchard, 2011, p.214) and offers a simple and rational model of explanation rooted in the utilitarian tradition. The actors of the motions of support are "rational" actors in the economic sense of the term, that is to say they make the decision to act or not, by evaluating the benefits and costs that participation in the mobilization represents for him. Participation in the mobilization therefore does a priori more benefits than non-participation. Beyond the remuneration of the engagement which can be material or symbolic¹³ (Gaxie, 1977), the motions of support participate in an instrument of legitimization of the governing sustainability of President Paul Biya (1) and of the regime in place (2).

1.1. The legitimization of the governing sustainability of President Paul Biya

The analysis of the discursive content of motions of support makes it possible to understand them as an instrument of legitimization of the governing sustainability of the President of Cameroon¹⁴. This rhetoric of legitimization is built around four (4) arguments, among others: the restitution of the fundamental freedoms of citizens, the continuity of the institutional tradition of the country, the uses of cultural relativism and the fight against corruption.

Regarding the argument of the restitution of the fundamental freedoms of citizens, it is considered here in the perspective of the political uses of democratic theory or popular sovereignty. From the point of view of the CPDM's political emissaries, the limitation of the elective mandate is scripted as a freedom-killing and anti-democratic provision. The sovereignty of the people is the cornerstone of democracy. For supporters of the name limitation of the elective term, to limit the number of presidential terms is to express a kind of mistrust in the capacity of discernment of the people. Alexander Hamilton, known for his hostility to the principle of rotation and the limitation of the number of elective mandates, considered that re-eligibility was necessary for the people, as a mechanism for approving the conduct of elected officials who have shown themselves to be talented and virtuous during their mandate (quoted by Loada, 2003, p.154).

Paul BIYA's rhetoric of legitimizing the "perpetual presidency" is also based on the thesis of the continuity of the institutional tradition of the country, of which none of the successive constitutions since 1960 contained provisions relating to the limitation of the number of presidential terms. Because the various constitutional clauses having governed the number of presidential mandates in Cameroon since its accession to independence on January 1, 1960 until 1996, namely article 13 of the Constitution of March 4, 1960, article 10 of the Constitution of September 1, 1961 and article 7 of the Constitution of June 2, 1972 have always advocated the non-limitation of the elective mandate (Tchoupie, 2009, p.12-13). This created and maintained a cumulative movement crystallizing the trajectory of Cameroonian politics of the re-eligibility of the head of state. The evolution of the practice here, has indeed constantly carried out along a specific axis, which has encouraged the development of political addictions which cannot be abandoned overnight. This dynamic allowed the Head of State to announce his decision to readjust certain constitutional provisions while scripting his attitude as a response to an urgent demand from the Cameroonian people. For, in the message he sent to the nation on December 31, 2007, he was able to state:

From all our provinces, I have received many calls for a revision [of the Constitution]. I am obviously not insensitive ... We will therefore, in this spirit, re-examine the provisions of our Constitution which deserve to be harmonized with the recent advances of our democratic system in order to meet the expectations of the vast majority of our population.¹⁵

The objectification of the above, shows that the motions of support make it possible to show to the national and international opinion that the recipient of the motions of support who is the central head of the political system is loved by the people. In other words, despite the weight of his age and his longevity in power, he continues to enjoy the support of the people, the political party that invested him and its elites. And so, he does not retain political power through arbitrariness or the allegations of electoral fraud brought forward by the opposing class, but with popular consent. From the point of view of political analysis, motions of support are part of a governmental instrumentalization.

President Paul Biya's "perpetual re-eligibility" legitimization discourse also revolves around the uses of cultural relativism, that is, of cultural specificity. According to Ferdinand Ndinga Ndinga, parliamentarian and counselor to the CPDM section (ruling party) of Dja and Lobo IV for example, Africans who do not yet have the

¹³ (build a network of friends, or project a self-worthy image, for example).

¹⁴ Les concepts de « gouvernement perpétuel » ou de « présidence perpétuelle » illustrent également l'idée « d'un gouvernement à durée illimitée au Cameroun, lire sur ce point Owona-Nguini et Menthong, 2016, p.97-114.

¹⁵ For more details on this message, see among others: Mutations n ° 2063 of January 2, 2008, p.15.

culture and political and democratic maturity of Westerners do not respect and do not obey only a leader whom they fear. In other words, the assimilation of democracy into Western culture also subtly legitimizes "perpetual governance" in Cameroon. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some African leaders were already organizing the protest against democracy by presenting it as being linked to the culture of the West, as being incompatible with African culture. made up of consensus, communitarianism, respect for the leader, etc. (Sindjoun, 2001, p.113). On closer inspection, the positioning of democracy as a trademark of the West, as a product of its culture, feeds the issue of identity and difference cultural in international relations (Jaffrelot, 2000; Diamond, Linz, Lipset, 1993 cited by Ibid).

Moreover, the justification of "perpetual government" also instrumentalizes the fight against corruption¹⁶. The specter of the emergence of a group called "Generation 2011 (G11)" in the very entourage of the President of the Republic, who began to fight openly to take power after the possible departure of President Paul Biya at the end of his term in 2011 (Tchoupie, 2007, p.13) is a pretext to legitimize the "perpetual presidency" in Cameroon. This has fostered the development of the idea that it is only the possibility for the President of the Republic to stand for election as a candidate for the presidential election that can enable him to retain all his powers and all his authority until during the period preceding the convocation of the electorate¹⁷. In this way, the removal of the limitation on the number of presidential terms is scripted as a guarantee of political stability in Cameroon. In other words, the thesis of the specter of threat to political stability in Cameroon allows us to maintain "a dissuasive doubt"; given that the possibility for him to run for another mandate at the head of state largely contributes to containing the ardor of the actors whose engagement in a fierce fight for the succession to the President in office can be harmful for the socio-political stability of the country¹⁸. Beyond the legitimation of the presidential figure, motions of support contribute to the perpetuation of the regime in place.

1.2. The legitimation of the perpetuation of the regime in place

The majority of those questioned affirm that motions of support are a resource mobilized by the politico-administrative bureaucracy for the preservation of political power in Cameroon. As Jean-Marcellin Manga shows :

Redoutant qu'un départ de leur champion entraîne la perte de leurs privilèges, les appels à candidature peuvent aussi être appréhendés comme « un moyen pour les élites d'enserrer le Prince et de l'acculer à rester au pouvoir. Dans cette perspective, la longévité du Président devient une ressource pour conserver certains monopoles. Conscientes de l'embarras que suscite la candidature de M. Paul Biya, ces élites tentent de fabriquer un habillage pour lui donner une légitimité qui viendrait du peuple (...) (Manga, 2019 : p.159).

At the basis of motions of support are client relationships, that is, a relationship of personal dependence not related to kinship that is based on a reciprocal exchange of favors between the people, the boss and the client who control unequal resources (Médard, 1976, pp. 103-131; Médard, 2000, p.). We can, starting from the definition of the clientelist relationship, distinguish three constitutive features: the personal relationship, the relationship of reciprocity (or exchanges), and the relationship of dependence. A fourth character must be added: the vertical structure¹⁹. The customer relationship is a characteristic form of social exchange based on the exchange of gifts and counter-gifts. Motions of support lead to a distinction being made between two levels of President Paul Biya's customer networks: the core and second-class customers. The nucleus is made up of a few faithful, particularly close, loyal, attached to the person of Paul Biya, many by calculation than by feeling. They are the "lieges" in the different communities. The entourage includes second-rate clients, linked to the faithful of the President of the Republic. In the context of socio-political pluralism which is the bearer of areas of uncertainty, Cavaye Yeguié Djibril, for example, has instead opted for extensive and ethno-community clientelism in the local political society of Tokombéré. In the different communities, Mouyang, Zouglo, Ouldémé, Mada, Cavaye Yeguié Djibril has representatives who serve as back-up during political competitions. During local elections, he has teams made up mainly of people to whom he has offered employment either in the Cameroonian public administration or in the National Assembly (Alawadi Zelao, 2017, p.371).

¹⁶On the fight against corruption as a convenient way to get rid of troublesome political opponents (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 129); see also Tchoupie, 2006, pp. 57-80.

¹⁷ This idea is defended among others by Mr. Ferdinand Ndinga Ndinga, La nouvelle expression n ° 2122 of December 05, 2007, p.7.

¹⁸President Paul Biya has also to a large extent supported this idea in his message to the nation on December 31, 2008 by declaring that the constitutional revision which took place during the year which is ending made it possible to lift the mortgage that weighed on the political life of the country by making all options possible.

¹⁹Powell mentions unequal status, closeness and reciprocity. But inequality does not only concern status and dependency, which is certainly linked to inequality, seems to us to be an even more distinctive sign (Powell, 1970 cited by Ibid, p.105).

Motions of support can be analyzed structurally in this regard as an overlay of customer networks. When the Head of State distributes prebends, such as a post of Director of a public company, or a ministry direction, it is understood that for the beneficiary it is a private accumulation base, which must be used to meet its needs and to meet its own redistribution obligations (Médard, 2000: 85). As Jérôme Black and Aleen Lakhani point out, the fact that ethnic groups are part of the political elite is an indication of the possibilities of access to the corridors of power conferred by the political system (Cited by Mouiche, 2011: 8). And in an Africa where the record of a senior civil servant's career often boils down to the question of knowing what advantages he has granted to his family (in terms of the most desirable social positions, credit facilities and obtaining contracts public, recruitments in national schools, jobs in parastatals, study grants, etc.) (Mouiche, 2011); motions of support can be analyzed as a framework for political transaction between political circles, business circles, academia and religious circles; party members who deliver votes are remunerated by public office. Businessmen hope to gain political advantage from their presence in motions of support in terms of access to public markets and or tax exemptions; officials hope to gain or maintain strategic positions of power; it is also a breeding ground for professional recruitment for young students; it is also "a modality of legitimization for informal churches through the commodification of prayer" (Menguéle Menyengue, 2020). These political practices show "the construction of political loyalties from which various clientelist arrangements that the ruling categories imagine in order to stabilize their hegemonic positions" (Sindjoun, 1997: 89-129).

However, one cannot glimpse the true scope of the rationalities at work behind the motions of support if one ignores the socio-political context of their productions. Social context and political context are therefore determining factors for the future of the mobilization²⁰. On the social level, these motions of support are spreading in Cameroon in a context marked by poverty, the clientelist distribution of state resources and the extreme psychosis of politico-administrative retirement. Lumumba-Kasongo's observation is imperative here, when he notes that in the context of a difficult peripheral economy due to the effects and impact of structural adjustment programs or political tampering, clientelism creates easier conditions for the commodification of political space, without any ideological concern (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2007: 130-131 cited by Tchoupie, 2007, p. 27).

On the political level, the motions of support surge in a context marked by the presidentialist configuration of power (Hond, op.cit, 230-240 cited by Assana, 2020. p 250) and a strong interweaving of modern politics and traditional politics. Indeed, careful observation of Cameroonian political life reveals the centrality of the presidential institution, the primordially of the bureaucracy as a hegemonic category and master of state power (Ngayap, 1983), and above all the political weight of traditional leaders. This political weight of traditional rulers allows the problem to be repositioned around the nature of the state. The state in Cameroon is "a state of chaotic nature or the state Janus who integrates two contradictory orders of domination namely: rational legal domination and traditional domination"²¹. This state transgresses the watertight borders artificially erected between tradition and modernity. There is today a generalized tendency of the socio-political elite body to seek out or monetize the titles of traditional nobility (Alawadi, 2017). While the President of the Republic, Paul Biya, is given the status of *Nom nguii* (chief of chiefs in the *Beti* language), the other members of the governing team have a foot in the tradition. Some cases are striking on this subject: Jacques Fame Ndongo, Minister of Higher Education is head of *Nkolandom* (South); Martin Belinga Eboutou, Director of the Civil Cabinet at the Presidency of the Republic, reigns over the village of *Nkilzok* (South); Fon Angwafor, national vice-president of the CPDM is the *Fon* of *Mankon* (North-West); René Ze Nguelé, Senator and former Minister is a 2nd degree chief of *Nguelmedouka* (East); Gervais Mendo Ze, former Director General of CRTV is chief of *Otoakam* (South); Chief Inoni Ephraim, former Prime Minister is a chief in *Bakingili* (South West) and *Dakolé Daissala*, senator, former minister and *lamido* of *Goundaye*. This modern political elite indeed inaugurates a new era of traditional chieftaincy (Balandier, 1967). It is now illusory to locate a clear demarcation between modern power and traditional power. However, motions of support are not only intended for internal political legitimation but also for international political legitimation.

2. An instrument of international political legitimation

In an international context marked by the fluidity of the demarcation between the internal and the external (Sindjoun, 2001: 105-106), it is important to avoid the territorialization of the analysis of support motions, to lock them up here in the internal prison. The trans nationalization of the political life of African states also affects the nature of the foundations of the internal political order. What prevails here is to consider the elements of an international order that promote the mobilization of motions of support in Cameroon. On analysis, motions of support also fulfill several international functions, on the one hand, they constitute a

²⁰ On the influence of the social and cultural context, we can notably cite the work (Oberschall, 1973).

²¹ On the two types of domination, read usefully (Sindjoun, 2002: 77; Zelao, 2017, p.376).

channel of expression of international protest (1) and on the other hand, a technique of communication, propaganda and marketing. International politics (2).

2.1. Motions of support: a channel for expressing international protest

Motions of support as a channel for expressing international protest are part of a government response strategy against international pressure or external threats. Indeed, the positions taken against corruption, financial embezzlement and the violation of human rights in Cameroon operated by part of the international community are the work of heterogeneous actors. These include: Amnesty International (AI), Greenpeace, Transparency International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), International Crisis Group, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development (CCFD), Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT), etc. For the most part, these positions revolve primarily around the fight against corruption, financial crime and above all the consideration of human rights on the part of public authorities. On the international geopolitical scene, there are many, these Western associations and agencies which investigate the violation of Human Rights by national governments. They have succeeded in establishing themselves as essential transnational actors²². In such an international political context, states are compelled to take a stand on human rights. The daily Economy, which echoes this in its Friday edition, refers to a document issued by an organization called Freedom House, which pinpoints Cameroon as a country where political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of the press are not favored (...) (Cameroon Tribune n° 11078/7277, p. 4-5)²³.

However, the constraints resulting from interdependence do not completely nullify Cameroon's room for maneuver in international relations. Observation of reality leads to enriching the multiple options considered by Cameroon by integrating defection as a possible behavior²⁴. So, it is with the protests by the Cameroonian government. During a press conference held on July 20, 2016²⁵, the Minister of Communication, Government Spokesperson, Issa Tchiroma Bakary reiterated following the Amnesty International report made public very precisely on July 14, 2016 that: "Cameroon's response to the terrorist aggression of Boko Haram is done with respect of human rights, even if the enemy opposite is not an actor of international law" (See Cameroon Tribune, N° 11141/7340 of July 21, 2016, p.7). From the synthesis of the support motions studied, the government response is constructed from the enumeration of "multiple prejudices", the denunciation of "numerous lawsuits", "of a campaign aimed at discrediting the forces. defense of Cameroon", the deconstruction of the "alleged abuses of the army against Nigerian civilians", the reminder of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram, the reminder of the context in which the military operations being carried out currently on the field against Boko Haram (Read Bertold, 2018), Cameroon's adoption of legislation to repress terrorist acts, etc²⁶. In addition to the international protest, motions of support also participate in a technique of communication, propaganda and political marketing on an international scale.

2.2. Motions of support: A technique of communication, propaganda and international political marketing

Motions of support appear in the Cameroonian political context as a technique of communication, propaganda and international political marketing favored in a democratic context, the bearer of political uncertainty. Through this technique, the people or at least part of them express their support for the President of their political party and encourage them in their implementation of public policies. According to an informant: A political party has an interest in polishing its image, the image of its leaders, as well as that of its activists. It is in the role of political parties. A political party is constantly on a political campaign. All the acts that are taken by a political party have a political aim. The goal is to work to stay in power. Motions of support participate in a kind of support for the hierarchy and the rulers. At the same time, it is a device of international communication,

²²On the strength of these transnational actors (See Rosenau, 1990).

²³See (Cameroon Tribune n° 11078/7277, 41st year / 41year / Tuesday, April 19, 2013, p. 4-5).

²⁴This concept is borrowed from Albert Hirschman any reference decontextualized. In his famous trilogy, he sees defection as the radical rejection of liberal democracy as a legitimate mode of political organization; it is the act of certain political regimes such as China, North Korea, Cuba, Saudi Arabia and others; this situation is maintained by a minority of states in the current international context (...) (See Hirschman, 1995.)

²⁵This is a report on the issue of respect for human rights in Cameroon's fight against the terrorist organization Boko Haram. This report comes after the precedent of the same kind committed in September 2015. In these various reports, Cameroon is accused by Amnesty International of trampling on observes the most basic rules in terms of respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, in his fight against the terrorist organization Boka Haram.

²⁶Beyond the Islamist threat, the anti-terrorism law is now an instrument for the surveillance and control of populations by the governing order. Thus, the law appears as a tool for consolidating the hegemony of the governing elite in a context of multifaceted crises (read on this point, Bertolt, 2018, p.86).

propaganda and political marketing. It is also a way of telling the Western partners that the Cameroonian people are in the boat of the President of the Republic (Interview of 07/27/2020 in Bertoua).

It is crucial to point out that the massification of the uses of supportive motions is taking place in a configuration of political extroversion. International election observation is at the very heart of the requirements of contemporary international law (Khouma, 2012: 06). The certification of the elections would thus pass by an international interference legal, a kind of "democratic interference" and "multilateral aid to democratization" (Keutcheu, 2014). According to a Cameroonian informant from the diaspora:

Political issues, especially electoral issues in sub-Saharan African countries, remain to a large extent extroverted; it being understood that we are in configurations in which democratization appears as a controlled process, in the sense that there is a political prescription. It cannot truly be said that the democratization process that we observed in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s was driven from within. Apart from a few countries like Senegal, where notable democratic advances were already noted before the pressure of the 1990s, we know that the Baule's speech played a large part in triggering democratization. This is not to say that the internal impetus that was given thereafter was negligible. On the contrary, we also know that the Western countries, in particular the tutelary metropolises, remain very attentive to political developments in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and on occasion, the great powers do not hesitate to interfere, untimely. The most exemplary case is the media release of the President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron condescendingly calling on his counterpart Paul Biya, President of the Republic of Cameroon to release the opponent Maurice Kamto, leader of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement. (CRM). It makes a lot of noise on the web. It is a form of condescending and hurtful attitude that blatantly shows that the political issues in extra-western societies in Africa in general and in Cameroon in particular remain strongly extroverted. We also often see that the political actors and not only those in power, but also the political actors of the opposition seek to go to the metropolis to acquire a certain political anointing to influence the national political scene. As we can see, the Movement for the Renaissance of Cameroon (CRM) do, through the mobilization of the anti sardinard brigades which lead political activism, in particular in Germany, England, France, the United States etc. or the participation of Nkou Vondo, leader of the political party UNIVERS in the electoral campaign of the Democratic party in the United States within the framework of the 2015 presidential election. All this is done because the starting hypothesis is that, the more it echoes in the West, the more likely it is to have an impact in Cameroon. The motions of support which are addressed to the rulers, to the regime in place are not only produced in the internal Cameroonian political field. But, there are also motions of support which are produced by a certain number of groups and activists of Cameroonians from the diaspora, in particular the mobilization of the anti-sardinards²⁷ brigades have generated motions of support for the regime to the effect of polish the political image of the said regime and of the President of the Republic who is its main recipient (Interview of 08/08/2019 in Freiburg).

In the light of the above, motions of support as the expression of the socio-political tension between the local, the national and the global reflects the dynamics of the new selections of collective action in international relations (Sommier, 2004). These spatial referents are levels observation and analysis. What is more, the local and the global can be thought of as forming a continuum (Sindjoun, 2002: 38). From the analyzes of Joseph Keutcheu (2014), we can observe that the political interference of France in Cameroon is thus structured by the desire to (re) valorize the state itself in a context of degradation of the image of France. on the African continent. The motions of support are a reaction against the challenge to state power by much of the Cameroonian diaspora²⁸. To believe Ousmanou Pitang, former parliamentarian of the CPDM: "When these Cameroonians from the diaspora who are cut off from the realities of Cameroon take a stand or make noise in a very ostentatious way, the objective is to undermine the regime in place or even overthrow it in order to set up a

²⁷According to the information cross-checked in the newspapers, the choice of the expression Anti-Sardinards comes from the fact that, sandwiches made of canned bread and sardines were regularly distributed to the populations, during meetings of the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM). The emergence of this Anti-Sardinards Brigade, which is growing in scale, is undoubtedly one of the most unprecedented and unexpected consequences of the last Cameroonian presidential election of 2019. This dynamic owes in particular to social networks. Today, the B.A.S aims to be secular and apolitical. It brings together fighters from the Cameroonian diaspora, anxious to defend the interests of the people, by leading noble and fair battles, against all those who, from near or far (artists etc), support a tyranny that has lasted for thirty-six years in Cameroon. The B.A.S maintains close links with many organizations. This is the case, for example, of the C.C.D, the Council of Cameroonians of the Diaspora, headed by Robert Waffo Wanto. It is the same for the founder of the Collective of Democratic Organizations of the Cameroonian Diaspora, Brice Nitcheu, who, from London where he resides, wants to be an active support of the brigade.

²⁸For France, it is a question of keeping "its head high" in international interactions around the theme of democracy.

new government that will be in their pay” (Interview of 08/15/2020 with Ousmanou Pitang in Meiganga). It is interesting to note that by transporting competition and internal political struggles internationally, these players in the Cameroonian political game inform "democratic interference" in Cameroon (Chouala, 2001, p. 295-330). From another perspective, motions of support are an alternative instrument of expression for weak states (Zartman, 1997). Because according to an informant:

Given the geostrategic position of African states on the international scene, there are certain positions that could be difficult for central leaders to take through institutional channels. Moreover, motions of support are an alternative instrument for disseminating certain messages and deriving political benefits from them. It is an instrument which increases the leeway of weak states in the field of international communication, by revealing the limits of institutional channels which are slow to move. It is not fashionable for African States to enter into frontal logics, especially in battles against Western powers, whether it is their leaders or NGOs which are more or less affiliated to them because of political, economic and military power relations that are unfavorable to them. In this way, infra-state structures such as political parties use motions of support to disseminate messages that the central power would like to disseminate. In this wake, central leaders directly or indirectly arouse motions of support. (Interview on 07/30/2020 in Yaoundé).

In the words of this informant, we can see how the motions of support offer Cameroonian leaders' room for maneuver, a space for expression in which to invest and develop debates that are not on the institutional agendas. In the structuring of power relations at the international level, motions of support constitute a framework for the expression of ultra-nationalism. In an international scene overdetermined by the hyperpower America, where opposition to democracy is seen as a form of anti-Americanism, African states must subtly guard against the residual influence of the realistic school of international relations (Sindjoun, 2007, p.). According to another informant, motions of support are part of the international marketing of the presidential figure in Cameroon who is facing the challenge of political alternation:

Motions of support are technologies of political mobilization which are not only dedicated to internal political legitimation but also to international political legitimation. For example, when the anti-sardinar brigades mobilize to discredit the image of the Head of State of Cameroon on the Place de Paris or at the intercontinental hotel in Geneva, well, the activists and the emissaries of the CPDM initiate counter-marches to promote a contrary effect. Some motions of support are raised by the top of the state to show that President Paul Biya is worshiped, contrary to what is projected outside. In a malicious way, the regime in place which is rightly or wrongly taxed by a part of Cameroonians from the diaspora of "dictatorial", of "criminal" always manages to project an idealized international image of the regime in place. We must also not forget that the great metropolitan powers are present in Cameroon through their diplomatic representations in order to observe everything that is happening and report to their respective states. The mobilizations that can be noticed in the Cameroonian political field, whether they are against power or for power, are mobilizations that have an impact on the judgment that Western diplomats can have as interested observers. These motions of support are not only intended to legitimize power or to make it credible in the eyes of Cameroonian citizens, but also in the eyes of the international community. We are in a democracy, and how can you claim that a Head of State is not legitimate when his citizens are mass mobilization through motions of support that appear in the print media or the audio-visual media. In a context of the acceleration of interdependence, there is a superposition of political arenas, political fields or political orders (internal and international) which are topologically separated, but in which the actors mobilize in a bijective way, being understood that, what is done here has an impact there and vice versa. Based on this principle of reciprocal structuring effects, the effects of superimposed fields or the principle of geopolitical structuring, the actors mobilize very strategically for the conquest or conservation of power (Interview of 06/09/2019 in Basel).

Even African leaders whose regimes are labeled authoritarian because of the clusters of relevant clues deny themselves and claim democracy. However, contrary to the thesis of the militants of the regime in place, some Cameroonian informants from the diaspora believe that the motions of support are more of an outlet for internal political contradictions:

The teleological function of motions of support is to deflect internal political contradictions and / or bad governance, by channeling internal forces towards a supposed or real external enemy. It is a preventive response to the internal political contradictions of the state. What plays out in the motions of support are the forms of internal capitalization through the construction of a scapegoat, by indexing the Western powers or the Cameroonians from the diaspora. In other words, it is a way of distracting national opinion. It is a register of political manipulation; it being understood that democracy operates under the register of manipulation. It is a form of strategic intelligence deployed by the governing order to consolidate its hegemonic position (Interview of 09/16/2019 in Paris).

This is, moreover, what Nicholas Machiavelli already emphasized when he taught that the designation of the external enemy is a classic process. When you have trouble governing your people, then you declare war on your neighbor. In other words, the projection of an external threat can promote intra-group cohesion, as

suggested by a large number of experimental studies in Social Psychology (Bornstein, 2003: 129-145). In public discourse, it is seen in the forms of the internal enemy and the external enemy (Pommerolle, 2015, pp. 163-177 cited by Bertolt, 2018; Assana, 2016, p. 88). In Cameroon, the figure of the enemy is linked to the exercise of authority and the consolidation of the state. In times of crisis as, just as in a routine period, rulers calculate. The only thing that changes are the instruments (Dobry, 1992).

IV. CONCLUSION

At the end of this analysis, it clearly appears that the motions of support participate in the conservative mobilization of the ruling class in their quest for institutional rent in order to preserve its hegemonic position in a democratic context, the bearer of political uncertainty. Motions of support bring together the ruling class in two ways: through the profiles of the actors involved in this movement, the development methods and media of media publication and their discursive content. These motions of support are carried by the political, economic, traditional and intellectual elite. These elites exercise a monopoly in the development of motions of support. These motions of support are a document produced by the CPDM, which are subject to official publication. Its main distribution media are the Cameroon Tribune, the government daily, and Action, the press organ of this political party, the party in power. In their discursive content, the motions of support are a framework of sacralization of the political figure of Paul Biya and the glowing record of the regime in place and. Motions of support are part of a rational phenomenon, led by the entrepreneurs of the mobilization. Motions of support are also structured on the basis of opposition between dominant and dominated positions. It is a framework for expressing the balance of power between political elites, between ethnic groups, between resident Cameroonians and those in the diaspora, and between the rulers and the ruled. It is a strategy of mobilizing the ruling class. Motions of support are also a framework for the struggle for power. The massification of the uses of motions of support in the public space in Cameroon testifies to the interest and importance of the mobilization of the dominant class in the same way as the dominated actors with different resources; with the understanding that "the hardest part is not to get to the top, but to stay there". We cannot systematically link social movements to vulnerable categories.

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