

A MICRO-SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF A POLITICAL PARTY: THE MDR¹ OR THE AUTOPSY OF THE CAMEROONIAN OPPOSITION.

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ABSTRACT:-In Cameroon since 1990, a multitude of political parties that have emerged alongside the CPDM, the party in power, have been characterized, including the party (MDR) that is the subject of our discussion. In particular, we suggest that the analysis of a political party must be accompanied by an approach that will have allowed us to shed light on the trajectory of its main leader. We also suggest that it is more judicious to dissociate the career of the politician and the circumstances of the emergence of this political party within which actors and political entrepreneurs compete for legitimacy and resources in order to further invest spaces and/or institutional positions.

Key words: political party, MDR, opposition, democratization, politician.

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Cameroon, like other African countries south of the Sahara, has not remained indifferent to the democratization movement that has taken place since 1990. This crucial stage in the life of the state is marked by profound changes observed in the emergence and production of structures of animation of the political scene. Thus, we have observed a multitude of political parties that have emerged alongside the CPDM², the party in power; political formations that are part of what has been called the Cameroonian opposition.

Indeed, the reflection that underlies the lines that follow concerns the analysis of a political party that is part of the panorama of the partisan opposition, a fairly new phenomenon that requires the renewal of the debate that can allow for the appreciation of the entire political dynamic of the democratic process that has been underway since 1990. This debate seems to be a long-term one, as democratizations have had varying fortunes, as Gueye has noted from Africa in general.³

Thus, the transition process in Cameroon since 1990 has created a political framework in which partisan political organizations, some of which are more or less formally structured, now operate, including the party that is the subject of our discussion. The question that arises is how to grasp the nature and dynamics of the opposition, which is now active in the political game from a political party, the MDR. Also the questions related to the emergence, that is to say to its birth, to its logic, to the conditions of exercise of the political competition are so many critical subjects which served as seeds, materials to our reflection. All in all, our line of reasoning remains dominated by the scientific need to understand and explain the logic of functioning, the managerial capacity of the Cameroonian opposition as a whole in its quest, exercise and control of political power, as

¹ M. D. R. stands for Movement for the Defense of the Republic, a political party born following the multiple laws liberalizing Cameroonian political life in 1990, so-called liberal laws. See Collection of Laws

² C.P.D.M.: Cameroonian People's Democratic Movement, the party in power.

³ B Gueye, "La démocratie en Afrique. Succès et résistances", Pouvoirs, n° 129, 2009, pp 16-20.

Célestine Keutcha points out⁴, since the advent of the new democratic era where the political landscape is strongly atomized⁵.

From the above, we support the idea that, for its coherence and heuristic value, the analysis of a political party must be accompanied by an approach that will have allowed us to shed light on the trajectory of its main leader. But before entering into the demonstration of our hypotheses, it is advisable to briefly revisit the theoretical productions on the fundamental notion of political enterprise. In other words, to avoid any ambiguity, how is this notion defined?

In fact, political entrepreneurship is a concept that has been the subject of abundant political and economic literature, as authors such as Donald P. Green and Shapiro have demonstrated⁶. In this panorama of authors, François Facchini⁷ says that political science essentially focuses on the search for power and doubts that political action can be reduced to the search for monetary profit. The economic science is by nature more interested in the definition of political profits. This author distinguishes the political entrepreneur from the economic entrepreneur. Authors such as Attarca Mourad and Lassalle-De-Salins⁸ have made a real review on the subject and have given an account of this controversy as to the existence of the distinction or complementarity between the two types of investor. But it is Jean-Patrice Lacam who will settle the debate by defining the concept of political entrepreneur in these terms: "*Like a company director, the politician is an entrepreneur. He is an entrepreneur, not in the common sense that, as an elected official, he manages the affairs of the community, but in the sense that, on the one hand, he builds up a capital of resources useful to his career, and where, on the other hand, his capital is built up, he activates his resources with the aim of producing power.*"⁹

Without being too long-winded in the search for a definition of political entrepreneurship, let us say, following Lacam, Mourad and Maryvonne, that the "*notion of political entrepreneurship can indeed be seen as a transposition of the principles of entrepreneurship to the political field*"¹⁰.

Following this literature on the notion of political entrepreneurship, it should be said that the politician and the businessman are not necessarily opposites, but this complementarity is limited from the moment the politician is not an entrepreneur in the sense of a managerial administrator, but rather a strategist who aims at accumulating resources that he capitalizes on in order to conquer and exercise political power.

If this is the description of the politician, in which register should Dakole Daïssala and his political party be placed? Hence the interest to think the political-bureaucratic trajectory of the National Coordinator of the MDR.

II. Dakole Daïssala¹¹ and the MDR: an investor and his political enterprise

For a good and profitable understanding of this political actor and his enterprise, it seems to us more judicious to dissociate the career of the politician and the circumstances of the emergence of this political party within which actors and political entrepreneurs compete for legitimacy and resources in order to further invest spaces and/or institutional positions. And this exercise sheds light on the concrete manifestation of the democratization process that began in 1990 and thus on the competitive electoral consultations for both the legislative and presidential elections. These operations inaugurate the renewal of pluralistic experiences between the opposition as a whole and the government for the control of the local and national political arena.

⁴ C. Keutcha Tchapnga, "Droit Constitutionnel et conflits politiques dans les Etats francophones d'Afrique noire", in *Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel* 63, n°3, 2005, 453 p.

⁵ There are currently 339 legalized political parties in Cameroon. Source: Archives of the Ministry of Territorial Administration.

⁶ Donald P. Green and Shapiro, "Rational Choice and Politics. Why do we still know so little?", *Revue française de Science Politique*, 1995, 96 p.

⁷ F. Facchini, L'entrepreneur politique et son territoire, *Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine*, n°2 2006, 264 p.

⁸ M. Attarca and Salins M.L.-D. "Quand l'entrepreneur devient entrepreneur politique... le cas du développement de la méthanisation agricole en France", in *Revue française de gestion* 232, n3 2013, pp 25-44.

⁹ J. P. Lacam "le politicien investisseur. A model of interpretation of the management of political resources" op. cit. p. 25

¹⁰ M. Attarca and Salins M.L.-D. op. cit., p 27.

¹¹ It should be clarified from the outset that the real name of Dakole is Menwa which will become Menkamla after the initiation. Dakole is the name of an initiation promotion that took place in 1955 and according to our investigations, he would have been born during this period when the French President, General De Gaulle had just liberated France. Today, all his official documents bear the name Dakole followed by the name of his father Daïssala.

A- DakoleDaissala or the itinerary of a politician at the crossroads of the traditional and the modern

Questioning the itinerary of a political actor in Cameroon raises the question of the objectification of political activity as a form of daily social practice, as recommended by Auguste Nguelieutou¹². In other words, the exercise of political activity as a professional activity requires a certain number of parameters that are not negligible in the Cameroonian context of the moment, where certain skills¹³ that can be described as prerequisites are required for the exercise of the profession or the engagement in a political career. Nguelieutou cites in this panorama of criteria, the social origin, the diploma, the profession exercised before the entry in the political career¹⁴. In the same sense, Roberto Michels considers that *"thanks to the competence that they provide in professions that are not very or not at all accessible to the masses, the technical knowledge of the leaders virtually ensures their non-removability. It elevates the leaders above the masses and subjects the latter to the command of the former."*¹⁵

In fact, by relying primarily on the primordial and natural criterion, the interest that the variable of social origin characteristic of a good fringe of the Cameroonian political elite arouses is situated above all at the level of the relationship that power has with it, and consequently with the types of feudalities¹⁶ that produce a certain number of political actors who already have legitimacies of the traditional type in contemporary Cameroon. It is worth noting that the evocation of the phenomenon of feudalities is of interest in this work because these feudalities play a role as a springboard and support for power. They have allowed the post-colonial state to fulfil the feudal functions which are, among others, the maintenance of the mass in obscurantism, subjection and dependence for the purpose of all kinds of levies, especially in the northern part where the most retrograde type of traditional feudalism prevails¹⁷. Consequently, the existence and complicity of these archaic structures with power make *"any principle of rigor illusory and the difficulties of giving birth to democracy remain insurmountable because they constitute a real challenge for the emergence of a true democratic culture and society to such an extent that any informed analyst is led to wonder whether Cameroon is a Republic or a juxtaposition of feudalities."*¹⁸

This being the case, it is necessary to return to the social in order to understand the logics and trajectories of power construction at work in contemporary Cameroon. This poses the problem of the prior definition of the social.

In a general way, the social is constitutive of all that concerns the society without excluding the economic, the cultural and the political. One can say that everything is social or has social aspects.

To better understand our subject and the way in which the power is structured or built, it is advisable to raise the various capitals of which speaks Bourdieu¹⁹ i.e. the cultural capital, the symbolic capital, the social capital and the economic capital. All these capitals, by penetrating and by entangling themselves command interactions, strategies, of actors or social agents whose intelligence can be lodged only in the social relations. The accumulation of these capitals and their development generate for their holders the construction of spaces of power because these capitals are all the more important that they ensure the monopoly of the legitimate domination.

From the above, as Jean-François Médard said²⁰ about Charles Njonjo in Kenya, in order to analyze the power of a politician, one must begin by taking stock of his political resources, that is, the means of power that are at his disposal as a result of a progressive accumulation process.

Thus in the present case, Dakole was born on April 15, 1943 in the chiefdom of Goundaye²¹. As a prince, he is surrounded by a feudal social origin which gives him the quality, the ancestry and the competence

¹² A. Nguelieutou, Tchad, le peuple dans la vie politique postcoloniale, PhD thesis in Political Science, University of Yaoundé II, July 2004, p 314.

¹³ On the criteria relating to the capacity to exercise political responsibilities, see D. Gaxie, *Le sens cache, inégalités culturelles et ségrégation politique*, Paris, Seuil, 1978.

¹⁴ A. Nguelieutou, op. cit.

¹⁵ R. Michels, *Les Partis Politiques*, Paris, Flammarion, 1914, p. 17.

¹⁶ Feudalism as a research theme is at the origin of many works, among which 4. M. Bloc, *La société féodale*, Paris, Michel Albin, 1968, 762 p., M. Dobb and P. M. Sweezy, *Du féodalisme au Capitalisme, problème de la transition I ET II*, Paris, Maspero, 1977, 238 p and 191 p.

¹⁷ We are referring to the lamidat of Rey-Bouba where the 1^{er} vice-president of the Cameroonian Senate is enthroned.

¹⁸ See H. Fendjougue, *La démocratisation chez les Toupouri. Deux élites, deux trajectoires politiques au Nord-Cameroun*, *Revue africaine d'études politiques et stratégiques*, n°4 (2007), pp. 165-187.

¹⁹ About the different capitals, see P. Bourdieu, "Les trois états du capital culturel", *Actes de la recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 30, 1979, pp 3-6, *Le sens pratique*, Paris, Minuit, 1980, 447 p.

²⁰ J.F. Médard, "Charles Njonjo. Portrait d'un Big Man au Kenya" in E. Terray (ed.), *L'Etat contemporain en Afrique*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 1987, pp. 49-87.

to exercise the profession of political leader just like many other political actors who constitute the Cameroonian ruling class today²². He inherits family assets of primary importance that give him a social capital that will allow him to access the first positions when the cards are distributed at the time of independence.

This birth predisposes him to the management of the public space, to social ascension as Philippe Braud says²³, especially since the colonial period until now, the Cameroonian political power has always used the royal families for the selection of the administrative and political staff. The same status as a prince has given Dakole the opportunity to acquire the capital of notoriety and popularity, and to gain the individual and personal credit required for the exercise of the political profession.

With the benefit of this family capital, Dakole will have the right to schooling, a privilege that for a long time was reserved only for the sons of chiefs in the northern part of the country²⁴. It must already be said that by conferring legitimacy on certain actors or social agents, the cultural capital represented by the school constitutes a vehicle, a channel, or even a logic and a trajectory at work for the manufacture of power. In Cameroon in general, the school not only ensures the production and reproduction of the ruling class, but also the shaping of inequalities, where school titles allow certain agents to always be classified at the top of society. In other words, the school is an instrument for the production of the elite, a real "*Homo academicus*", giving shape in turn to a real "*Homo hierarchicus*"²⁵ in the "*Summits of the State*"²⁶ or of civil society.

These generalities evacuated, Dakole made his entry in the school yard of Goundaye, the pilot school of Pitoa and the Classical High School of Garoua where he will leave with the diploma of Baccalaureate, parchment which will allow him to go to France to continue his studies which will be crowned by the diploma of the School of the High Studies of Overseas, option Economics. This will allow him to integrate the Cameroonian administration upon his return to the country where he will assume many responsibilities within the state apparatus. Among the positions he held, there is the Secretariat of the Federal Administration of North Cameroon in Garoua from 1968-1969, the positions of 1st Deputy Prefect in Ngaoundéré, Sub-Prefect in the same city, Deputy Director of General Administration at the Ministry of Finance, Director of the Urban Transport Company of Cameroon, before ministerial positions, fruit of his alliance in the game of democratization.

The exercise of these responsibilities is the basis for the accumulation of the various capitals we mentioned above, insofar as one acquires many experiences that serve as a foundation for a social actor to build and expand his social and political surface. Thus, Dakole has typically accumulated important responsibilities in various domains²⁷ which have allowed him to build up an immense relational capital that extends as far as

²¹Goundaye is located in the district of Taibon, capital Dzikilao, department of Mayo-Kani, capital Kaelé, Far North Region, capital Maroua.

²² In contemporary Cameroon, social origin is more than valued for the exercise of the political profession. The traditional chieftaincies have produced in the Cameroonian political system its highest leaders such as. Inoni Ephraim, SadouHayatou, Simon AchidiAchu, Bello BoubaMaigari, former Ministers and Prime Ministers, Ayang Luc, former Minister and Prime Minister and current President of the Economic and Social Council, CavayeYegueDjibril, current President of the National Assembly, AboubakaryAbdoulaye, former Secretary of State and current 1st Vice-President of the Senate, Ibrahim MbomboNjoya, King of the Bamouns (deceased), former Minister, Dr. Adamou NdamNjoya, prince and former Minister, Jacques Fame Ndong, traditional chief and current Minister of State, Minister of Higher Education etc., the list is far from being complete. The list is far from being exhaustive.

²³ Ph. Braud, *La vie politique*, Paris, PUF, 1985, 127 p.

²⁴ On the difficulties of schooling in North Cameroon compared to the rest of Cameroon, see J. Y. Martin, *l'école et les sociétés traditionnelles au Cameroun septentrional*, Cah. O.R.T.O.M., ser. Sci. hum. VIII, n3-1971.

²⁵ About "*homo academicus*" or "*homo hierarchicus*", see P. Bourdieu, *Hommoacademicus*, Paris, Minuit, 1984, 299 p. and L. Dumont, *Homo hierarchicus*. Essai sur le système des castes, Paris, Gallimard, 445 p.

²⁶ See on this subject, P. Birnbaum, *Les sommets de l'Etat*. Essai sur l'élite du pouvoir en France, Paris, Seuil, 1977.

²⁷ Back in Cameroon, Dakole occupied in turn a number of responsibilities, which allowed him to accumulate capital that he put to good use in the political game since the beginning of democratization. He was Secretary General of the Federal Administration of North Cameroon, Sub-Prefect of the Ngaoundéré district, Deputy Director of General Affairs at the Ministry of Finance, Director of the Transport Company, Director General of the Urban Transport Company of Cameroon, the last position of responsibility he held before his imprisonment in 1984.

Chad²⁸, a country in which he seems to stay from time to time to recharge his batteries on the level of African magic²⁹.

One question deserves to be asked. How was the academic success of Dakole, a non-Muslim, experienced in a region acquired by the Islam-Fulani? It is necessary to look at popular imagery to try to answer this concern. Indeed, the common Toupouri think that the prince of Goudaye is an exceptional man and credited with an exceptional quality that allowed him to overcome all the barriers, the pitfalls set up by the Ahidjo system to block the Kirdi learners. In this context of discriminatory school policy of France, because "in the Islamized regions, the European public school was almost perceived with suspicion (...) doubt on its secular character and certainty that it was the vector of corrupting foreigners"³⁰ as noted by A. Dadi, The young learner that is Dakole succeeds in imposing himself because of his origin of son of chief.

Still in the register of historical events that have allowed the prince of Goundaye to accumulate capital, the history of the practice of initiation or *Goni* among the Toupouri figures prominently. Indeed, Dakole is considered in the local milieu as the fierce defender of the practice of initiation that the authorities have forbidden since 1961 during a meeting held in Yagoua and chaired by the deputy prime minister Mohaman Lamine. However, in defiance of this ban, the initiation was organized in 1975³¹ and the authorities seized the opportunity to repress the offenders by burning granaries containing millet. This did not please Dakole who expressed his bitterness to President Ahidjo. And this stance in favor of initiation gives Dakole not only the status of defender of the cause of non-Muslims in general and of the Toupouri in particular, but also the status of being outspoken, courageous and daring, because he was the only Christian to express his feelings, feelings of approval or disapproval to President Ahidjo in a context where any gesture was likely to be qualified as a subversive act and deserved an adequate and appropriate repression.

To complete the picture of the considerations on the assets of Dakole in the process of accumulation of capital, it is necessary to mention his sober lifestyle and his sociability, because during our investigations, it is said that he liked the practices of the populations such as the *Gourna* dance³², the local beers like the *bil-bilin* vogue among the Non-Muslims of North Cameroon. In short, he was the son of the soil who spared no effort to promote the culture of his people, hence the name Menkamla³³ which materializes and translates his passage to initiation, promotion of 1955 known as *debsia*.

To satisfy a certain curiosity, it is appropriate to note a phenomenon that seems trivial but full of meaning, namely the choice of the emblem of the M.D.R. consisting of a stick placed diagonally on the map of Cameroon. Why the preference for the stick? The impartial observer thinks that this choice is dictated to honor the memory of his late progenitor who was called *WoingGrao*, i.e. the stick woman, version for some, and for others, this choice of the stick is oriented by his affection for the *Gourna* dance and the use of the stick for the execution of this local dance is systematic. Both options seem acceptable to observers of Toupouri society.

This being the case, it is an opportunity to say that the evocation of his initiation name alone is enough for him to be considered as the authentic son of the soil. It is also a mark of his personality as a man of integrity and a defender of the Kirdi cause, qualities that are highly valued in his tribal environment. He will use all this reputation in favor of his party when it will have a legal existence and during the electoral consultations that will follow. All these assets allowed the politician to build an immense relational empire, but the element that has

²⁸Dakole is from a mother of Youaye, a Toupouri of Chadian origin, hence his familiarity with that country. He regularly attends the annual ritual ceremonies organized by Wang Doré, the Toupouri spiritual leader based in the Mayo-Kebbi East region, in the Fianga district of Chad.

²⁹Source: interview.

³⁰A. Dadi, Tchad, l'Etat retrouvé, Paris, l'Harmattan, 1987.

³¹In 1975, an initiation took place in Toupouri country. It was a promotion called *NdikdandiDolé* which attracted many young people and the repression was considerable since millet granaries were burned by order of the Prefect of Mayo-Danay at the time, Mr. Bassoro.

³²*The Gourna* is one of the emblematic dances of the Toupouri populations of the far north of Cameroon. It offers young people to stuff themselves with millet flour porridge, especially red, mixed with cow's milk in order to gain weight and these young people show off their bare chests to liven up ceremonies such as visits of high level personalities such as Heads of State, funeral ceremonies etc. The former member of the government often takes the steps of this dance when the opportunity arises to mark his sympathy with his people and gain their trust. This is the attitude of a populist politician.

³³Menkamla is the real family name of the Coordinator of the M.D.R. The name Dakole that he bears is the translation of the Toupouri version of De Gaulle, the name of a former President of France, stuck to him because he was born when this French politician was in business and his name was the symbol of a strong, powerful, savior man

most marked the spirits, remains his imprisonment, his incarceration like so many others following the failed coup of April 6, 1984 when some elements of the army³⁴ rose to overthrow the regime of President Biya.

Indeed, for the common man, Dakole was a victim of his geographical origin. He was not involved in this perilous adventure of 1984. But what matters to us is neither the reason for his arrest nor the conditions of his detention, but rather the political consequences and the enactment of this arrest which made Dakole an icon, a myth among the non-Muslim populations of Northern Cameroon. This explains his choice as coordinator of the MDR and later the enthusiasm and massive support of the voters for this party during the first local consultations of the democratic era. In short, Dakole came out of prison in 1991 as a martyr victim of injustice, and as a result, he accumulated more resources for persuasion and awareness raising for the popularization of his party, the MDR. Without exaggeration, for some, he was the "*Mandela*" of the marginalized Kirdi, as evidenced by the welcome he received at the Maroua-Salak international airport when he landed for the first time fresh out of prison. This huge, galvanizing reception was a predictable sign of a successful political leader in an electoral contest.

We cannot close this chapter without saying that Dakole, who came from a political-administrative background like the cadres of his generation, was the only one who not only refused Islamization, but denounced it as a method that violated the secular character of the state, and thus as an unconstitutional bullying. This has contributed to making him a hero of the Kirdi cause unlike some of his compatriots³⁵. Can this explain why he was not promoted to a ministerial position during the Ahidjo era? All things considered, everything leads us to believe that his refusal to embrace Islam was one of the reasons for not giving him the responsibility of managing a ministerial portfolio, whereas it appears that his institutional resources linked to the multiple political and administrative functions that he assumed predisposed him to the management of a ministerial position, he will only assume this responsibility in the context of democratization with the fallout of his party within the framework of the game of alliances with the party in power, the CPDM.

B- The M.D.R.: from think tank to political party

Let us recall first of all that the option for Cameroon of a civilization of political modernity was translated concretely by the liberalization and the deconstruction of the authoritarian system whose legal support remains the liberal law n 90/056/ of December 19, 1990 relating to the political parties. It is thanks to this provision that the MDR was born under the impulse of Dakole Daissala in spite of the controversies that revolve around its creation, that is to say that for some and others the Movement for the Defense of the Republic was in its baptismal fonts a think tank set up by non-Muslim executives from various socio-professional strata.³⁶

³⁴ In Cameroon, there was an attempted coup d'état to overthrow the regime of President Paul Biya in 1984. In the opinion of observers, this coup was orchestrated by some elements of the Republican Guard, most of whom were nationals of the far north region of the country. In collusion with the coup plotters or not, Dakole, a citizen of the far north like the insurgents, was imprisoned and only regained his freedom after the adoption of the 1991 amnesty law.

³⁵ The political history of Cameroon has known two non-Muslim elites who became Islamic for social ascension: we can cite Hakassou Jean, Massa, who obtained the post of Minister without Portfolio and SadjöEngokai who was promoted to Minister of Education after having converted to Islam.

³⁶ Various groups of Kirdi cadres are disputing the paternity of this party, which was nothing more than a think tank in the run-up to the announcement of the opening of the political landscape. These people felt that it was necessary to be armed when the time came, that is to say, to have a commodity at the appropriate time on the political market. Among these groups and depending on the city, we can cite in Maroua : Ritouandi François, Toupouri and a bank executive, Matourwa Tchakréo, Toupouri and a meteorological services executive, Mbesso Saidou, Toupouri and a Public Works Engineer, Waichoué Justine, Toupouri and Executive of the Ministry of Sport and Physical Education, Dr. Ali Toupouri, Toupouri and Doctor, Dr. Dourwé, Toupouri and Pharmacist, Zouané Jonas, Moundang, Pagou Taidandi, Moundang, Warai Mesmin Toupouri and Agricultural Engineer. In the city of Yagoua, we can mention: Djona Jean, Massa and Agronomist, Bambé Justin, Toupouri and Labor Inspector, Dr. Djonlaye Wanribélé, Toupouri and Pharmacist, Reyang Bloum, Toupouri, Minkreo Léon, Toupouri, Paayang Samuel, Moundang and in Garoua, the circle included the following characters: Koulandi Jean, Toupouri and researcher at IRAD, Zogué Yeouna, Toupouri and executive at the Ministry of Sport and Physical Education, Powé, Toupouri and Textile Engineer. All these people are fighting for the paternity of the MDR and claim that Dakole is only their representative and not the founder of the party. In reality and according to our investigations, the idea of setting up a political formation was adopted in May 1991 during the last meeting which took place in Goundaye, Dakole's native village. The participants proposed a certain number of acronyms and gave Dakole the mandate to choose one and to write the statute and the internal rules of the future party, a mandate that he will carry out thereafter until the formation of a political party in due form. This one will be legalized by decision n283/D/MINAT/ of October 09, 1991 with its seat in Yaoundé.

Beyond this paternity war, this political structure remains, alongside the ruling CPDM, the party that has contributed most to the democratization process in non-Muslim areas in North Cameroon. From rural to urban dwellers, from the young to the not so young, from men to women, from the rich to the not so rich, in their majority, everyone has more or less recognized themselves in this political formation. This seems to explain the victory of this party in the legislative elections of March 1992 and the municipal elections of January 1996. This is obviously one of the explanatory variables among many others, because for many non-Muslims, it is a party of liberation, of challenging the Fulani hegemony, and it is also a party within which one can flourish. Such is the option of the majority of the non-Muslim voters during this period when it was for this party its baptism as a political formation in search of votes for its registration on the political scene in full change. It was truly the opportunity for the irruption of the poor³⁷ in the national political game after several decades of exclusion and marginalization.

In general, the M.D.R. has had a legal life after the reinstatement of the multiparty system, which was overshadowed for a long time by a de facto one-party system. From the think tank of non-Muslim cadres to its transformation into a party formation, this party has played a remarkable role in the national political game like the others that furnish the Cameroonian political landscape. Dakole will use it as an instrument, even as a political commodity to make his career take off.

In light of the above, it is interesting to try to shed light on the political architecture of a country from the perspective of party life. It is thus appropriate to grasp the political leaders and their parties in their deployment, their action in the democratic game because there is no doubt of the capital and major role played by the political parties, even if they are of the opposition, in the democratization in Cameroon.

III- The M.D.R. and Dakole in the political game in Cameroon: the opposition without an opponent.

Two moments or two major episodes mark the life of the M.D.R. under the magister of Dakole. They are the elections of March 1, 1992 and the alliance signed between this party and the R.D.P.C. Party of the same year.

Indeed, the holding of elections being a major barometer of democracy, Cameroon, in order to seal its return to partisan pluralism and to mark its adherence to multiparty political competitions, undertook the test organization of the multiparty legislative elections of March 1, 1992, consultations during which the voters were called to freely choose their representatives among several candidates, to corroborate the hypothesis of Sindjoun Luc who says that "*the electoral competition appears as a procedure of legitimization of the power*".³⁸ In other words, "*access to political trophies results from the election*"³⁹ following this relevant observation of Daniel Gaxie and Patrick Lettingue. This historic operation has seen the participation of some parties that have accepted the rules of the game while others have simply refused to take part, opting simply for a boycott⁴⁰ of these operations. Dakole and his party entered the dance for the designation of his representatives, a gesture that allows the analyst to classify him in any register of politicians.

A- The M.D.R. and the legislative elections of March 1st 1992: a political enterprise at the service of a political investor.

It is useful to return a little to the concepts of political entrepreneur and investor, an exercise that has been done in the preceding pages but that is necessary because of the heuristic potential of this notion of enterprise.

Thus, in light of what has been said above, the portrait of the political entrepreneur emerges as a man who not only knows how to seize business opportunities, but also innovates by implementing an efficient organizational structure for their exploitation, as Ramādī puts it.⁴¹ This portrait is closer to the painting done by Facchini who says that "*the political entrepreneur is the individual who seizes in political action a means of enriching himself*"⁴². He adds "*that the wealth of political professionals is directly linked to the work of political coordination that they carry out, in other words to the matching of political demands and offers as well*

³⁷ J. M. Ela, *Afrique, l'irruption des pauvres. Société contre ingérence, pouvoir et argent*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 1994, 266 p.

³⁸ L. Sindjoun, "Elections and politics in Cameroon, unfair competition, coalitions of hegemonic stability and the politics of affection" in *African Journal of Political Science*, vol.2 n1, 1997, p.90.

³⁹ D. Gaxie and P. Lettingue, *Les enjeux municipaux*, Paris, PUF, 1984, p 10.

⁴⁰ These elections were boycotted by the SDF, the main opposition party in 1992.

⁴¹ A. Ramadji, *L'opposition partisane dans le système politique tchadien, 1993-2011*, Thèse de Doctorat es Science Politique, Université de Bordeaux, juillet 2015

⁴² F. Facchini, "L'entrepreneur politique et son territoire" in *Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine*, (2006), 263-280.

as to their capacity to resolve conflicts of efficiency or distribution through political innovations⁴³". Continuing his reasoning, the author suggests that "the idea of political enterprise refers to the idea of the political market, which he identifies as an abstract place where agents competing for political brokerage attempt to exchange political goods for active or passive support"⁴⁴.

In the wake of authors who have made the connection between the political party and the enterprise, we must also note the work of Michel Offerlé who postulates in his book "that a political party must first be thought of as a space of competition between agents, as a political enterprise"⁴⁵.

With the help of this learned and edifying literature on these notions, which are very important to understand the M.D.R. in its dynamics on the national political scene from the legislative elections of March 1^{er} 1992 and the use that Dakole made of this victory, we are of the opinion that he corresponds to the prototype of a political entrepreneur and this action also serves as an explanatory scheme of the entrepreneurial logic of a good number of leaders of opposition parties in the Cameroonian partisan universe

Taking up the analysis of the 1992 legislative elections, everything leads us to believe that it was during these consultations that the Alliance game took place between the M.D.R. which obtained six (6) seats in the two departments of Mayo-Kani and Mayo-Danay and the R.D.P.C. The R.D.P.C. obtained eighty-eight (88) seats which did not allow the latter to have a majority to form the Government, hence the recourse to Dakole's party which, as a skilful political entrepreneur, succeeded in this deal which allowed him to obtain four ministerial posts and a post of vice-president of the National Assembly whose management will cause him all the misadventures for the rest of his political career. It is obviously the effects of the platform signed in 1992 between the President of the Republic, president of the RDC, the party in power and the MDR, one of the political parties of the Cameroonian opposition, which can be deciphered in the following pages.

In fact, the victory of the M.D.R. in the 1992 legislative elections was limited to the two departments of Mayo-Kani and Mayo-Danay, as we have already mentioned. This reveals the deficit of territorial implantation and the confinement of Cameroon's opposition political parties in bastions or electoral strongholds⁴⁶, with the exception of the party in power which, given its long history of implantation and the use of State resources, has covered almost the entire country. In this perspective of the opposition's shrinking territorial space, the M.D.R. is confined to the two departments of Mayo-Danay and Mayo-Kani, which allowed it to obtain the votes needed for the six seats obtained⁴⁷. Achille Mbembé confirms this when he states that "the M.D.R. is a small party confined to two non-Islamicized departments of the Far North"⁴⁸. This assertion by Mbembé is scientifically questionable insofar as an in-depth analysis has allowed us to discover the realities of these two essentially cosmopolitan and heterogeneous administrative districts at all levels: denominational with the cohabitation of Muslim, Christian and animist religions, ethnic where the Toupouri, the Moundangs, the Guiziga, the Peuls, the Mousgoums, the Kanouri, the Mouseyes and some other ethnic groups of the diaspora live without many clashes...

Everything suggests that Dakole is an investor at the head of a regional political enterprise, as we have just seen with the rest of the opposition. In this respect, one can also validly argue that the M.D.R. is a party counting on the non-Muslim vote in the sense that all six elected members are of Christian or animist persuasion. This reveals that it is the social and historical cleavages against the background of the religious divide that have determined the behavior of political actors in the northern part of Cameroon.

Indeed, it is important to recall the historical context for understanding the advent of the first multiparty elections of the democratic era in the northern part of the country. These elections came at a time when the non-Muslim population was reeling under the weight of several years of frustration on the part of the Muslim minority, and the enthusiasm of the frustrated population for the M.D.R. was simply an expression of the desire for change and liberation. Some would see it as the revenge of the oppressed against history as Jean-François

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴F. Facchini, 2006. Op.cit., p 5-6.

⁴⁵M. Offerlé, *Les partis politiques*, 5th edition, Paris, PUF, 2006.

⁴⁶As proof of these constituencies of the opposition parties, we can say that the UDC had only the Department of Noun as a stronghold where its president, the late Dr. Adamou NdamNjoya, is from, the SDF was established in the North West, South West, part of the West, the UDC was in the North West, the South West and the West. N. D. P. recruits its militants in the native region of its president, namely Bello BoubaMaigari, the M.R.C. owes its audience primarily to the West, the P.C.R.N. occupies more the departments of Sanaga-Maritime, etc.

⁴⁷Elected the day after the proclamation of the results of the legislative elections of March 1^{er} 1992 on behalf of the M.D.R. party were Messrs. Djonlaye Wanribele, Djona Jean, Siama Nathaniel, all from the department of Mayo-Danay and finally Messrs. Rindandi Djonkamla, Wassouo Maurice and Bilama Goki from the department of Mayo-Kani.

⁴⁸J. A. Mbembé, "Crise de légitimité, restauration autoritaire et déliquescence de l'Etat" in P. Geschiere and P. Konings, *Itinéraires d'accumulation au Cameroun*, Paris, Karthala, 1993, p. 347.

Bayart said⁴⁹. It is possible to find other explanatory factors for this revenge vote, but in the absence of methodically elaborated studies, we can stick to these few observations, which are certainly factual, but not without relevance. These elections have brought about a new dynamic in the perception of politics, which was essentially the prerogative of the privileged caste that had succeeded in taking over an entire politically unipolarized region. It has been noted that the strategy of the "left behind"⁵⁰ that is to say the social groups excluded from the political field, consisted in appropriating the advent of democracy as an opportunity that should lead to equal access to positions of power once monopolized by the islamo-fulani bloc, to paraphrase AlawadiZelao.⁵¹

All things considered, there is reason to consider Dakole's political group as having contributed to the promotion and culture of democracy in Cameroon for having accepted the rules of voting because, for Lagroye, "voting is accepting in practice a rule of the game, it is contributing to the establishment of a political order"⁵², it being understood that other ways of participating in debates and confrontations between social groups are excluded by the electoral activity.

It is therefore an undeniable reality and intellectual honesty requires us to recognize with lucidity that in 1992 and more precisely on March 1^{er}, legislative elections were held with the participation of the M.D.R., the C.P.D.P.M. and the N.U.D.P., to mention only these three parties which engaged in electoral jousting to win the votes of the voters in the departments of Mayo-Kani and Mayo-Danay. It is in this atmosphere of all the promises, as the popular adage says: elections are moments of promises, material advantages, realization of road, health and educational infrastructures, etc. that these elections of March 1992 will take place.

It is thus in this context of electoral bidding all azimuths that the M.D.R. gets six seats in Mayo-Kani and Mayo-Danay to the great displeasure of the provision of all the logistical means, materials, the offer of all types of goods as observed by Midepani⁵³ under other skies to channel the votes of voters by the other opposing parties, especially the R.D.P.C. and this victory has left some and others perplexed by asking a thousand and one questions such as: why did the R.D.P.C. lose in such and such a district; what are the motives of this defeat; why did the R.D.P.C. not invest in the female sex?

The analysis of the legislative elections of March 1^{er} 1992 cannot claim to be relatively satisfactory if we ignore the lack of respect for gender inclusion shown by the M.D.R. during these elections. In other words, since the beginning of the democratization process in 1990, the enthusiasm of women for investing in the public space is a constant fact. It is in this perspective that SeynabouNdiaye was able to say that "the twentieth century has shaped another woman citizen aware of what she represents by her right to vote."⁵⁴

The implementation of this inclusive legal dynamic is materialized in Cameroon by the adoption of a law dating from April 1992⁵⁵ modified and completed by another one of December 1992⁵⁶ which makes the taking into account of gender a legal requirement in the constitution of all the lists of candidatures for the different elections in Cameroon.

Finally, it is with the contempt of the non-observance of this legal device relating to the problem of the emancipation of the woman that the M.D.R. and its president manoeuvre on the political market with the stones in the shoes namely the female electorate.

B- The signing of the C.P. D. P.M. and M.D.R.: from visibility to decay.

Democratization in Cameroon is no longer a phenomenon to be demonstrated as evidenced by the competitive elections of March 1^{er} 1992. In other words, as Sindjoun Luc notes, we have moved "from the competitive referential of electoral politics"⁵⁷ to the choice of our leaders. And democracy can only be fully ensured if the political formations that animate political life participate, either individually when none of them

⁴⁹See on this subject, J. F. Bayart, "la revanche des sociétés africaine", in *Politique Africaine*, n°11, 1983, p. 99.

⁵⁰For the intelligibility of this expression, see J.M., Ela, *Ma foi d'Africain*, Paris, Karthala, 1958, p. 24.

⁵¹Z. Alawadi, "Multiculturalism, democracy and citizenship in North Cameroon. What sociological lessons", in A.A. Qwoda (eds), *Le Nord-Cameroun à l'épreuve des pluralismes. Quand les Sciences Sociales interrogent*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2012, p. 67.

⁵²J. Lagroye, *Sociologie Politique*, Paris, PFNSP, 2^e ed., 1993, p. 334.

⁵³L.M. Midepani, "Pratiques électorales et reproductions oligarchiques au Gabon : analyse à partir des élections législatives de 2006" in *Cairn*, pp : 47-65.

⁵⁴Seynabou Ndiaye, *Femmes et politique au Sénégal, contribution à la réflexion sur la participation des femmes sénégalaises à la vie politique de 1945 à 2001*, DEA thesis, *Etudes africaines, Anthropologie juridique et politique (1999-2001)* p. 56.

⁵⁵Law No. 2012/001 of April 19, 2012 on the electoral code in Cameroon.

⁵⁶Law No. 2012/017 of December 21, 2012, amending and supplementing the law of April 19, 2012.

⁵⁷See L. Sindjoun, "Elections and politics in Cameroon, unfair competition, hegemonic stability coalitions and the politics of affection", op. cit. p. 96.

has a majority in Parliament, or in the perspective of a coalition when this majority is lacking for the management of the supreme power. It is to remedy this lack of majority that the R.D.P.C. and the M.D.R. joined forces in 1992 to govern. What can we learn from this alliance?

The signing of the government platform between these two political parties shows that in the distribution of the cards in terms of posts, the M.D.R. is given four (4) ministerial posts, a post of vice-president and a post of quaestor at the National Assembly. The observer of the Cameroonian political landscape of this moment finds that this gain is in the size of this regional, even ethnic political formation. As far as identity is concerned, it should be noted that, as we have said above, the role of identities, whether ethnic, tribal or regional, has been studied a great deal in African political science⁵⁸ since they have been used as explanatory grids in the answers that researchers have given to the problems raised by African politics. These prisms have been used by some to analyze, to define the *"specificity of African powers"*⁵⁹.

Indeed, political entrepreneurship is a concept that has been the subject of abundant political and economic literature, as authors such as Donald P. Green and Shapiro have shown⁶⁰. With the signing of this government platform, Dakole shows himself to be a good political entrepreneur whose normal trajectory is first to win a position that will allow him to expand his fortune, as Daniel Bourmaud has noted⁶¹. The latter specifies that *"by mixing patrimonialization and bureaucratization as logics of power, the State in Africa is based in its very principle on the non-dissociation of political and economic roles"*⁶². This seems to be the consequence of the neo-patrimonial management of the state, which means that *"in order to increase the political capital available to the incumbent, power must be converted into economic capital, thanks to which it will be possible to attach clientele and dependents even more firmly. The mechanism is in a way self-perpetuating insofar as the economic resources reinforce the political position and, reciprocally."*⁶³

Clearly, the signing of the platform with the party in power, the Coordinator aims a specific objective that comes at the right time after seven years of incarceration, namely material gains and this allows us to join the thesis of Ramadji according to which *"it is the primacy of self-interest that conditions the opposition of survival, and pushes to political transhumance. It is not uncommon to note that from the very beginning of his democratic experience, material considerations related to obtaining ministerial posts took precedence over the real political struggle to be waged by opponents"*⁶⁴, especially Chadians. The situation is not much different in Cameroon, but *"the exploitation of public office for personal gain"*⁶⁵ is a scourge that undermines the values and credibility of the democratic process, as Beetham and others condemn.

Beyond the harmless act of the Coordinator of the M.D.R., the historical dimension of this act should be noted, namely that this signature led the opposition phenomenon in Cameroon to abort the production of democracy from the first hours of its experience in the game of democratization, since we will later witness the incorporation of other opposition parties into the camp of the party in power. In other words, the oppositional posture has become a phenomenon of survival from the moment when almost all the so-called opposition parties are unable to elaborate programs of alternation, with the exception of a few parties considered today as the radical opposition, but which are also struggling to forge in the collective imagination the national ambitions of their formations⁶⁶.

From the foregoing, the analyst can satisfy his curiosity by asking the following question: why has the Cameroonian opposition been unable to unite to form a majority likely to make an alternation possible? By proceeding to a simple exercise of arithmetic addition between the U.N.D.P. with 68 elected, the U.P.C. with 18 elected and the M.D.R. with its 06 elected, the Cameroonian opposition would have won the bet of the majority and by ricochet put the party in power in minority.

According to the Coordinator of the M.D.R., there is every reason to believe that such an undertaking had been initiated but aborted. That is why he said that when the same opposition parties tried to set up "a think

⁵⁸ In his book on the election of a head of state in Africa, Sévérin Adjovi notes the constants inherent in the struggle for power in Africa, among which region and culture occupy a prominent place. See S. Adjovi, *Election d'un chef d'Etat en Afrique*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2003; p. 35.

⁵⁹ J.F. Médard, "La spécificité des pouvoirs africains", in *Pouvoirs*, n°25 (189), pp. 5-22.

⁶⁰ P. Donald Green and Shapiro, *Rational choice and politics/ why do we still know so little*", *Revue française de Science Politique*, (1995) p. 96.

⁶¹ D. Bourmaud, *La politique en Afrique*, Paris, Montchrestien, 1997, p. 64.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 63

⁶³ *Ibid*

⁶⁴ A. Ramadji, *partisan opposition in the Chadian political system, 1993-2011*, PhD thesis in Political Science, University of Bordeaux, July 2015.

⁶⁵ D. Beetham, K. Boyle, *Democracy. Questions and Answers*, UNESCO, 1995, p. 99.

⁶⁶ The following are considered to be political parties of the so-called opposition in Cameroon today: the SDF, the UDC and the MRC.

tank for democratic convergence"⁶⁷ : "I was not personally involved in such an initiative (...), it must be said that the SDF and the UNDP find themselves in the framework of old loves which, in the past, have sometimes given rise to hypocrisy, sometimes to trickery (...). In 1992, political formations prevented the establishment of a strong opposition in Cameroon. Once again, let it not be a question of the childishness of 1992. The political landscape cannot be satisfied with Gala meetings."⁶⁸ .

Still in this attempt to set up this dynamic of democratic convergence, reactions were not made to wait, especially that of Bello BoubaMaigari, leader of the N.U.D. P. who, in a firm and categorical tone, condemns this approach with these words: "the N.U.D. P. has not engaged in any consultation of any kind with the S. D. F. and that no executive has received a mandate to do so. D. F. and that no executive has received a mandate to do so. Any N.U.D. P. militant who undertakes to negotiate with other political formations is in breach of general discipline and is exposed to the sanctions provided for by the statute and the internal regulations, as well as by the relevant resolutions of the party's authorities"⁶⁹ .

These multiple disassociations of the Cercle de Réflexion pour la Convergence Démocratique are the proof of the weaknesses of the Cameroonian opposition, in particular, and of the African oppositions, in general, because they reveal in broad daylight the primacy of the gastronomic consciences not to say that the oppositional postures are almost all driven by the "politics of the belly" as observed by Jean-François Bayart⁷⁰ . Under these conditions, how can African oppositions not experience "difficulties in moving from the phase of contestation to that of proposal"⁷¹, as Albert Bourgi was indignant. According to Bourgi, "one of the shortcomings of the democratic opposition in Africa is the difficulty it has in being able to embody the possibility of change by proposing a real alternative project, which would turn its victory in the street into a political victory."⁷² In other words, according to the literature of political theorists, we are experiencing a "democratic illusion in Africa"⁷³ and this risks leading to the disappearance of the notion of opposition from the African political vocabulary because it is incapable of really playing and influencing the democratic game.

The interpretation of this literature above, whatever the precautions of language one may have, allows us to say that since the onset of democratization from 1990, one notes with Giovanni M. Carbone the "recurrent fragmentation of opposition groups into a large number of weak and volatile parties, the role of ethnic identities and clientelist networks in the mobilization of voters, the structural limitations (...) and the low degree of institutionalization of the party systems on the continent"⁷⁴. This fragmentation of the party system and even inter-party alliances are evidence that these parties are created only for the sake of political and administrative gain and office.

All the above political literature calls us to question the situation of the M.D.R. in particular and of the Cameroonian opposition in general in order to refocus the debate on the problem of the capacity of Cameroonian political parties to distance themselves from the propensity and tendency towards survival which is today at the origin of the coming and going of politicians.

The M.D.R. leaves the impression of an opposition party of consensus, which means that there is no room for compromise, let alone for demands. It is a form of relationship in which the other does not exist. In other words, it is the elimination of the opposition or the negation of the oppositional phenomenon, as Ramadji⁷⁵ has noted with regard to oppositional political parties in the face of the M.P.S., the ruling party in Chad. It must

⁶⁷ Scientific caution obliges since we do not have reliable documents, we say that in 2002, a meeting of the Cercle de Réflexion pour la Convergence Démocratique took place at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on Wednesday April 3, 2002. The meeting was attended by S. D. F. (Maidadi) and S. D. F. (Maidan) cadres. D. F. (MaidadiSaidou), of the N.U.D. P. (CélestinBedzigui) to which were added Yondo Marcel of the party M. LD. C. DorotheéNkom of the Socio-Democrats party, a representative of the MANIDEM party in the person of Paulin HilelaMatug and finally Edouard Tankwé of the Dynamics party. The meeting was not attended by personalities of the N.U.D. P. such as MohamadouBadjikaAhidjo and IssaTchiromaBakary who were expected to attend.

⁶⁸ See these statements in the interview Dakole gave to the newspaper Le Messager n°1346 of Friday, April 05, 2002, p. 2.

⁶⁹ See this interview in the newspaper Mutations n°628 of Tuesday, April 2, 2002, p. 03.

⁷⁰ J. F. Bayart, L'Etat en Afrique (la politique du ventre), Paris, Fayard, 1989, 439 p.

⁷¹ A. Bourgi, "L'Etat africain à l'épreuve du présidentialisme", in Les défis de l'Etat en Afrique, Paris, l'Harmattan, CREA, 2007, p. 56.

⁷² A. Bourgi, 2007. Op.cit. p. 56.

⁷³ M. C. Hounnikpo, L'illusion démocratique en Afrique, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2004, p. 10.

⁷⁴ M. C. Giovanni, "Understanding African Parties and Party Systems: Between Models and Empirical Research", *PolitiqueAfricaine*, n°104 (2006), pp: 18-37.

⁷⁵ A. Ramadji, op cit. p. 327.

therefore be said that the opposition political parties in Cameroon are to be placed in the category of those that François-Charles Bousquet calls "*complementary formations*"⁷⁶ without a vocation to govern.

In the end, no analysis of Cameroonian politics can ignore the hypothesis of the 1992 RDC and MDR platform as one of the historical keys to explaining the start of the democratic game, but also as a determining factor in the failure of a process that had barely begun. If this alliance allowed Dakole to profit in all its forms, since "access to economic resources depends, for the most part, directly or indirectly on the relationship to the state, on the relationship to power, transforming the state into a "*cheese*", as Boumakani said⁷⁷, this gain must also be interpreted as a strategic failure both for himself and for his party. This imprudence and indelicacy in the management of his electoral gains, of his stock of resources from the platform without the approval of the base, including his elected representatives, led to the crumbling and collapse of the M.D.R. (see graphs) and its President, who, in the twilight of his life, only existed on the political scene thanks to his constant support for the presidential camp. And the question of whether Cameroon will one day see an alternation of power through the front ranks remains a live one, because in the eyes of analysts, the parties are only accomplices of the government or, at most, the turkeys of the farce, to paraphrase Buijtenhuijs⁷⁸.

General conclusion and perspectives: from disenchantment to democratic malaise.

The analysis of a social phenomenon, of a social process at work, does not seem easy, especially when it is about power where the tricks, the strategies, the tactics and the prudence are mixed for its conquest, its exercise and its maintenance as long as possible. It is also the case of the study of political parties in the dynamics of democratization where it becomes difficult for the politician to disentangle the rational and the irrational on the part of the voters and even the political leaders.

This being the case, the reflection on the Cameroonian opposition in general and on one of its components, namely the M.D.R., in particular, plunges us into the concrete functioning of the power relations within the whole Cameroonian political class and informs us more on the dynamics of learning and adaptation to the democratic context which inhabits both the laymen and the professionals of the political thing.

The M.D.R. played a historic role as an opposition political party by joining forces with the R.D.P.C. in 1992 to enable the latter to have a majority to govern. This was a certain dynamic in the process of democratization, but at the same time, this gesture led to the collapse of the Cameroonian opposition, which is now struggling for survival. The locking and control of the democratic game by the party in power has stifled any possible form of alternation, creating a situation of malaise and disenchantment within Cameroonian political society where many still ask the question: when will democracy come to Cameroon? This question remains relevant.

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⁷⁶ F. Ch. Bousquet, "Oppositions and vocation to govern: towards another classification", in *Pouvoirs*, n°108 (2004), pp: 115-124.

⁷⁷ B. Boumakani, "La prohibition de la " transhumance politique " des parlementaires. Etude de cas africains" in *Revue française de Droit Constitutionnel* 75, n°3 (2008), pp : 499-512, p. 506

⁷⁸ R. Buijtenhuijs, *Transition et élections au Tchad, 1993-1997: restauration autoritaire et recomposition politique*, Paris, Karthala, 1998, p. 100.

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